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DAN L. GOLDWASSER

A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING VEDDER, PRICE, KAUFMAN & KAMMHOLZ, P.C.

212-407-7710

WITH OFFICES IN CHICAGO AND NEW YORK CITY

August 23,1999

Independence Standards Board
Sixth Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attn: ITC99-1
Re: Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client

Gentlemen:
I am writing in response to your invitation to comment on parameters for a standard for
determining audit independence with respect to relationships between a family member and the
audit client. At the outset, I want to congratulate you on your approach to this problem which
appears to be both reasoned and measured. I am particularly pleased that you appear to have
embraced the concept that certain potentially impairing relationships can be cured through
collateral safeguards. Such a concept is absent from current independence standards, with the
result that unnecessary restraints are placed upon a large number of persons (particularly at the
very large accounting firms) who have no relationship whatsoever with the performance of the
audit.
As a general comment, I would like to point out that your Invitation To Comment does
not address the period of disqualification; i.e., the document does not indicate the extent to which
a relationship of a short duration will impact auditor independence. I suggest that the statement
on family relationships address this subject.

Set forth below are my responses with respect to the various questions which you posed
at the end of your Invitation To Comment.
1.
Paragraph No. 1 strongly supports the concept that the independence rule should
be graduated based upon the proximity of the individual to the conduct of the audit.
Accordingly, I strongly favor stringent independence requirements with respect to those persons
deemed to be involved in the engagement. Correspondingly, I strongly favor relaxing
independence standards with respect to persons who are remote from the audit, such as family
members of partners who work in offices that are far removed from those which are involved in
VPNY/#49467.1
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the audit process.

2.
A.
As long as independence in appearance is a part of the conceptual
framework, I prefer Alternative B because it is more likely to provide the requisite level of
assurance needed for the public to accept audit reports. Should the Independence Standards
Board, as a part of its conceptual framework project, adopt other means to assure public
confidence in audit reports, it could (and should) consider Alternative A if coupled with
appropriate additional safeguards.
B.
While I am generally in favor of limiting the scope of independence
requirements, I do not believe that the public is likely to receive great comfort from the fact that
the CFO of the client is the spouse of a partner who works in a different department within the
physical office conducting the client’s audit. Accordingly, I favor a geographic definition of
office. In short, I am not convinced that close relationships between partners in different
departments within the same office do not abound.

3.
Although I believe that the Board should first adopt a conceptual framework
before proceeding with the adoption of particular standards, I see one very important advantage
to the Boards’ proceeding expeditiously with the adoption of a standard on family relationships;
and, therefore, would prefer the Board to postpone its consideration of financial interests which
would undoubtedly delay the publication of the proposed standard. My preference is based upon
my concern that the Securities and Exchange Commission may not support the Board’s
determinations if they depart significantly from prior standards endorsed by the SEC. Should the
SEC reject the Board’s position on this standard, all future efforts by the Board would appear to
be without significance. Therefore, I believe that it is better to assess the SEC’s support sooner
rather than later.
4.
The definition of a “close relative” as defined in the Glossary of Terms is
somewhat confusing and appears to be overly broad. If I understand the definition correctly, it
would include the in-laws of a non-dependent child, as well as the entire immediate family of the
spouse of a non-dependent child. Not only is this definition overly-broad, but it is also largely
unworkable. I would opt to have the definition of a “close relative” be limited to the spouse, co
habitants, dependents, non-dependent children, parent and siblings of a restricted person and
their respective spouses.

5.
The definition of “key position” as contained in the Glossary is generally adequate
on the assumption that the phrase “in a sensitive financial position, or with significant influence
VPNY/#49467.1
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over financial or operating matters” refers only to an officer or employee of the client.

The final phrase “or other individuals with comparable responsibility” is overly broad and
too vague and should be deleted. It would also be helpful if the Board provided greater guidance
as to what constitutes “a sensitive financial position.” Presumably, a key position is intended to
mean a person who is empowered to make operational or accounting decisions with respect to a
significant portion of the client business. It should not include a bookkeeper or even a senior
officer of an immaterial client subsidiary.

6.
I believe that current independence rules impose restrictions to an absurd degree,
although I am not opposed to prohibiting altogether an audit client’s employment of an
immediate family member of persons who are directly involved in the engagement. Not only
might the employment of immediate family members of a member of the engagement team be
deemed to impair the appearance of the independence, in periods in which jobs are not easy to
come by, it could impair independence in fact, irrespective of the nature of the job.
7.
I strongly support a graduated system of restrictions designed to assure audit
independence. Accordingly, any system which can be reasonably devised to safeguard the firm’s
audit objectivity with respect to seemingly marginal relationships would be far superior to simply
deeming the firm’s independence impaired. I am not sure, however, what is meant by
“consulting;” and it would be helpful if the Board provided further guidance as to what is
intended by this term.

8.
A.
From an independence perspective, an impairment at a subsidiary level
could be cured by having that subsidiary audited by a separate firm. I do not necessarily favor
this approach as it is my experience that the overall integrity of an audit is compromised when
separate auditors audit parts of a consolidated group of companies. This would be particularly
true if there are substantial transactions which take place between the subsidiary and other parts
of a consolidated operation.
B.
To be sure, an audit firm can build in additional safeguards to protect the
integrity of the audit process. Indeed, in the vast majority of cases in which independence is
deemed impaired, there is no impairment in fact. The question thus becomes whether the public
will accept such additional safeguards as a substitute for lack of independence in appearance.
My answer to this question is that the public’s confidence in the audit process can be maintained
under such circumstances, particularly if those additional safeguards are subject to monitoring
and reporting.
VPNY/#49467.1
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9.
The questions raised with respect to death or divorce are largely issues of timing
which the proposal does not address at all. Since it is my belief that current independence
standards are largely overkill, I believe that death or divorce after a relatively short period of time
would remove the impairment caused by the relationship between an in-law and an audit client.
In the case of divorce, the impairment should be removed immediately; and in the case of death,
there should be a short waiting period of approximately one to two years.
10.
In the realm of family relationships, independence is rarely impaired as a matter
of fact, but largely as a matter of appearance. Since no further impairing relationships come to
mind, I must conclude that they do not even rise to the level of an apparent impairment and,
therefore, the Board need not concern itself with them.

11.
As noted above, family relationships largely present issues of the appearance of
impaired integrity and, therefore, if the Board were to conduct any research, it should be to assess
the extent to which users of financial statements would perceive an impairment under certain
conditions. Until now, the independence rules dealing with family relationships have largely
been built upon conjecture and without any empirical study as to when the public does perceive
independence to be impaired. Such a study might even enable the Board to further pare down the
rules which it is currently contemplating.
As I noted at the outset, I am deeply gratified by the Board’s current efforts to put an end
to the process of devising independence rules on a “worst case” basis. The Board’s willingness
to adopt a more flexible approach to independence standards certainly appears to be a move in
the right direction; and my only hope is that the SEC will support the Board’s efforts in doing so.

Dan L. Goldwasser
/mbb
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Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client

Our Comments

We think that guidelines governing appropriate audit engagements should be
broad enough to include all relationships (not just family relationships)
that are likely to threaten auditor objectivity. The threat to auditor
objectivity arises from the substance (closeness) of relationships rather
than the form of relationships.
Close emotional ties could arise from other than family relationships, for
example, close friendships and love relationships. They could have been
established and nurtured from close proximity (e.g., neighbours), time spent
together (e.g., ex-school mates), or a combination of other factors.

Our Research Project
We are currently undertaking a research project that investigates, amongst
other issues, the following two questions:

(1) do audit partners consider it appropriate to accept an audit engagement
given the following relationship?
"Mr X is the Managing Director who owns 75% shareholding in Company XYZ.
Mr
X is the cousin of an audit partner, Mr Y.
In their childhood days, Mr X
and Mr Y grew up in the same housing estate and they have remained in close
and frequent contact even after they have established their own families."
While the professional code in Singapore, PAB Rule 11 (Code of Professional
Conduct and Ethics - Third Schedule) Section 2, does not specifically
prohibit the above audit engagement, it is not clear whether accepting the
engagement would be consistent with the spirit of the Code.
(2) would an engagement based on the above relationship significantly reduce
auditor objectivity?

Yours sincerely
Hian Chye Koh (Associate Professor)
El'fred Boo (Assistant Professor)
Nanyang Business School
Nanyang Technological University
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LOYOLA
UNIVERSITY
CHICAGO

Water Tower Campus
820 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Telephone: (312) 915-7111
Fax: (312) 915-7224

SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
Department of Accounting

September 15, 1999

Attn.: ITC 99-1
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775

This letter presents the comments of my Advanced Auditing class at Loyola
University on ITC 99-1 titled “Family Relationships between the Auditor and the
Audit Client.”
While we share the Board’s concern about the possible appearance of lack of
independence that may be caused by family relationships between the auditor
and the audit client, we believe the Board is embarked on a path that will cause
much mischief and will not improve on present AICPA standards.
If the daughter of an audit partner “on the Burger King engagement” by herself
obtains a job at a Burger King cooking hamburgers, the proposal would conclude
that the firm is not independent. We believe this borders on ridiculous and that
the current AICPA “audit sensitive position” rule is much more sensible.
We know that the Board’s charge is to write rules for publicly held client
situations. However, unless that AlCPA’s Ethics Division intends to conform its
rules to the issuances of the Board, we believe that the profession may end up
with three sets of independence rules:

•
•
•

Rules ofthe AICPA Ethics Division (the AICPA Professional Standards ET
Current Text).
Rules for public companies published by the Independence Standards Board.
Rules for public companies published by the SEC.

Some of the differences are likely to be very subtle and easy to overlook. For
example, the Board proposes to add the spouse’s brothers and sisters to the
category of close relatives. (They are presently excluded specifically from ET
101.11.)

Independence Standards Board

Page 2

September 15,1999

Another example of a subtle difference in the rules is that the definition of
“managerial employee” does not include the “profit sharing” concept in ET
101.11.
We are also troubled by the Alternative A under the “on the engagement”
definitions. It indicates a bias against smaller accounting firms. Moreover, it
proceeds on the invalid premise that only “technical consultation “ personnel
should be added to the prohibited class. The fact is that a particular partner may
often consult with a friend within the firm who is not designated for technical
consultation. Alternative B is a more preferable alternative.

Finally, we are unaware of any case that should cause the current AICPA rules
to be amended. Before you move on these new standards you ought to reply to
the old adage: “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”
Cordially yours,

Charles A. Werner, JD, CPA
Accounting Professor and Director of CPA Review

Sep-19-99

10:21P
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DeWitt F. Bowman, CFA
79 Eucalyptus Knoll
Mill Valley, CA 94941
415.389.0410 Tel
415.380.8994 Fax
DFBowman@aol.com
September 19, 1999

Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attn ITC 99-1
Dear Board Members
I appreciate the opportunity to offer the following comments on family relationships for
your consideration. As you observe, some of these issues are germane to the current work
of the committee creating a questionnaire on auditor independence and also relate to the
request for comment of the Public Oversight Board Panel on Audit Effectiveness
sponsored by the SEC. In the final analysis I find it difficult to separate the issue of family
relationships from the broader issue of the independence of the auditor and the question of
whether the auditor is an individual or the firm of which the individual is member.

My personal view is that in reality the auditor of a large public corporation is the firm
performing the audit and that the professional CPAs within that firm have a compromised
independence which is well known and understood by investors. My suggestion to the
Panel on Audit Effectiveness is that one way of achieving greater effectiveness would be
some form of certification for firms preparing audits of companies whose securities trade
on public exchanges. Certification would require application of rules relating to conflicts
of interest and periodic examinations to determine if rules and procedures were being
properly applied. In this situation relationships could be contained within regulations and
their conflicts mitigated by approved procedures such as are currently applied to
investment firms
On a broader scope a better, tighter definition and more frequent updating of generally
accepted standards would reduce the options available in the preparation of accounts and
might lessen the need for an overly strict definition of auditor independence, including
family relationships. As a practical matter conflicts arising from family relationships are
probably of a greater concern in the audit of a small private company than of a larger
public concern where investor interest is publicly focused on the result of an audit. This
1
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suggests that some mitigation from a strict application of relationship rules might be made
available in situations where other forms of control and oversight exist.
With these caveats I offer the following comments:
1. I support the changes proposed to apply the more stringent provisions to members “on
the engagement" rather than the lesser restrictions on ‘'members” as a whole. I suspect
that in smaller auditing firms members would tend to be “on the engagement” in any event,
while in larger firms easing restrictions on members not “on engagement” would better
accommodate the wider diversity of operations of these firms.
2. I support alternative A. The suggested controls in paragraph 4 appear to be adequate to
control the situation while still permitting greater flexibility of activity within the auditing
firm

3. I support deferring consideration of job related financial interests of relatives at this
time, although I believe that the issue will need to be eventually addressed in connection
with the whole question of financial interests as is suggested. Since the broad majority of
those interests probably involve the securities of publicly traded companies, some lack of
power of individual influence already exists under the condition of public scrutiny.
4. I believe the term “close relative” is well defined but I recommend adding
“co-habitants” in the following manner to deal with the broadening definition of
“marriage" “Member of the immediate family, nondependent child, parent or sibling and
their respective spouses and co-habitants, and grandparents and grandchildren of the
member and spouse or co-habitant”.

5. Since neither “underwriter” or “promoter” are apt to be individuals, I would broaden
the description to some extent. For example in the definition: “The individuals or firms
performing in the following rules ....”, and in paragraph 5: “.... or has investments with the
client or with someone or some firm in a key position with the client”.

6 Consistent with my support of alternative A in question 2, I would support a more
liberal application of tides permitting a firm to assess the likelihood of conflict and
influence then to rely on the other controls. This suggests that prohibition of any
employment at the client be limited to just those who provide audit services.
7. Paragraph 7 appears sufficient and the guidance appropriate.
8. I am generally opposed to the idea that having a different accounting firm audit a

material subsidiary where family relationship conflicts exist is sufficient mitigation. Just the
different methods or philosophy of a different firm might result in a less comprehensive
audit unless closely coordinated, which would lessen the value of independence. Some
2
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exception might be made for immaterial subsidiaries where the described device could be
used as a mitigating measure.
The other mitigating factors can help although the use of “firewalls” should be confined to

situations where some independent authority reviews the procedures and implementation,
as the SEC does for investment firms. Disclosure and discussion with the audit committee
are of limited value unless the board is truly independent.
To some extent reliance upon a general professional code of ethics which is enforced
through evaluation and disbarment for violation can provide more effective control than a
myriad of regulations which are difficult to know and keep current. Such measures could
also better define the fiduciary responsibilities of auditors, although I recognize that the
concept that auditors have a fiduciary responsibility to shareholders which can be legally
enforced is controversial.
9. I would not support expanding the proposal to include death and divorce. Both events
assume closure and subsequent relationships are subject to control of the courts. This
would appear to me to be a sufficient safeguard.
10 & 11. I am aware of no other key criteria or research that should be considered in this
study

I am interested in your work on family relationships and look forward to incorporating the
findings in the project on auditor independence.

Sincerely,

DeWitt F Bowman, CFA
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THE INSTITUTE OF

CHARTERED
accountants

22 September 1999

The Institute of
Chartered Accountants

ITC 99-1

in England & Wales

Professional Standards Office

JM/lmb

Silbury Court
412-416 Silbury Boulevard
Central Milton Keynes MK9 2AF

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

Telephone: 01908 248100

Fax: 01908 546260

Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York
NY 10036-8775

DX 31427 MK

www.icaew.co.uk

Dear Sirs
INVITATION TO COMMENT ON FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
THE AUDITOR AND THE AUDIT CLIENT
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the above.
I am very shortly to leave on holiday, and I concluded with regret that it would not be
possible for the UK Chartered Accountants Joint Ethics Committee to make a
Committee response in the time available.

The following therefore represents essentially a personal view. However I believe that
it is broadly in accordance with the position of CAJEC.
I am also copying this letter to FEE, who will, I understand, be making their own
response.

General - “the conceptual approach”

Both of the bodies referred to above, together with the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England & Wales, have committed themselves to a conceptual
approach, on issues of auditor objectivity and independence which is conveniently
categorised as “The Framework”. The member bodies of CAJEC (ICAEW, together
with the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland and the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Scotland) have been putting Framework-based guidance into practice
over three-and-a-half years now, and have I believe demonstrated that it “can work”!
‘Our’ version of the approach is based on analysing the threats/risks to objectivity
which arise in a particular situation, and weighing against them the generally-accepted
safeguards, so as to reach a conclusion as to whether it is safe and prudent to proceed,
or continue.
Chartered Accountants' Hall, PO Box 433, Moorgate Place, London EC2P 2BJ
Telephone: 0171 920 8100 Fax: 0171 920 0547 DX 877 London/City

One major advantage of the Framework approach is that it does not, in general, require
the ‘spelling-out’ of an infinity of possible situations and permutations.
It has however proved necessary to identify particular situations where the generally
perceived appreciation of a threat or threats to objectivity is so great that it would not
be in the interests of the public image of the profession for an audit to be accepted or
continued, whatever actual safeguards might be available. Such situations are
conveniently categorised as “prohibitions”. When one is seeking to evolve
‘framework-based’ guidance, it is therefore necessary to set a “floor” of situations
which are effectively prohibited. In all other cases the issues may be addressed by
‘frameworking’.

It follows from the above that the ‘floor’ should be set at a rational and realistic level.
Situations which are only marginally different from a prohibited one will clearly require
very special pleading by a firm which wishes to accept/continue appointment in those
circumstances.
I now go on to attempt specific answers to the 11 questions posed in your Invitation to
Comment. I should however warn that the responses will not be a great deal of use if
they are taken entirely out of the context of what I have already indicated!

A1.

It would in my view go too far to prohibit any employment by a relation with
the client. I would expect the significance of the particular employment to
feature among the considerations to be dealt with conceptually.

A2A. I suppose Alternative B, on the basis that the partner’s spouse is not
realistically going to decline the offer of a CFO role, whereas the firm, if it
valued the services of the partner, could seriously consider allocating the
partner to a different work office. That is based on my perception of what the
public appreciation would be if the partner were to remain at the engagement
office.

A2B. These are issues which would be taken in by the conceptual approach.
A2C. I don’t believe that the public perception accepts ‘isolation’ procedures in small
offices or practice units. Effectiveness of such procedures has also been the
subject of unfavourable comment in our courts recently.
A3.

I do not believe that it is practical to have guidance which is ‘partly conceptbased’ and partly not. I am therefore in favour of proceeding globally.

A4.

The definition is OK, insofar as definitions are necessary to a conceptual
approach. There is always a danger of people asking about half-siblings, stepsiblings, divorced spouses and so on. When the conceptual approach is fully
appreciated, it should theoretically be possible to get rid of many definitions.

A5.

I believe that this definition is in danger of becoming too technical/specific.
For instance could one not just refer to ‘an individual having significant
influence over financial or operating matters’?

A6.

I suspect that, on current public perception, the ‘prohibitions’ in paragraph 5
are probably necessary. My reasoning includes my appreciation of the public
perception of what you call “firewalls”, and what the UK used to call “chinese
walls” - although more modish terms such as “cones of silence” are being
floated!

A7.

Under the Framework approach, such issues would be under regular scrutiny,
to decide whether or not it was proper to continue an engagement.

A8A. This particular safeguard would, under the Framework approach, feature
among a list of operational safeguards.
A8B.

This illustrates, in my view, the dangers of trying to get too specific- and the
advantages of a conceptual approach.

A8C.

See previous response. There is a fair list of safeguards in the latest IFAC draft
guidance.

A9.

This illustrates the danger of getting too technical - unnecessary with the
Framework approach.

A10.

See A9.

A11.

Not that I am aware of.

Yours faithfully

J Maurice
Head of Ethical Standards
Direct Line: 01908 546283
Direct Fax: 01908 546296
E-Mail Address: JMaurice@icaew.co.uk

cc

Saskia Slomp - FEE

G:\pcdinv\pcd1lmb\JM\letters\sept\isb219
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September 22, 1999

California
Society

Certified
Public
Accountants

William T. Allen, Chairman
Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775

Re:

TIC 99-1

Dear Mr. Allen:

The Committee on Professional Conduct of the California Society of CPAs has
reviewed your "Invitation to Comment" on "Family Relationships Between the
Auditor and the Audit Client" The following material represents our answers to the
questions posed at the end of the document.
1.

2 A.

Notwithstanding our answer to question 1, if "on the engagement" is the
direction future independence definitions take, we support alternative B.
Partners or managers in an office which works on the engagement can
influence others who work on the engagement, even though they might not
work on it themselves.

2 B.

An "office" might be a practice unit, industry group or other grouping with a
specific management person within the firm responsible for that unit.

2 C.

Limiting the ability to influence to a small practice is irrelevant. In large firms
partners also have the ability to influence.

3.
1201 K Street
Suite 1000
Sacramento, CA
95814-3922
(916) 441-5351

We do not believe the changes are warranted. Even if independence is
defined in terms of personnel "on the engagement," we believe that all
partners of a CPA firm need to be included in the definition because all
partners are responsible for the other partners. Partners, regardless of
geographic location, still have the ability to actively influence an audit
engagement. In an age of instant communication, geographic location of
individuals is less critical in determining independence than other
considerations, yet this proposal seems to make it more important.

The ISB can deal with the two issues separately, but needs to recognize
that they may have to come back and deal with family relationships again
later.

Mr. Allen
Page 2
September 22, 1999

4.

The ISB should follow the SEC’s lead in defining close relatives. The term
should include a paramour.

5.

The definition of "key position" is fine.

6.

We believe that no family members of persons on the actual engagement
should be employed by the client, in any position. Those on the
engagement include those conducting any professional services to the
client, including tax or consulting.

7.

We believe all family relationships should be brought to the attention of the
internal firm review board and client audit committee, regardless of their
significance.

8.

The proposal should not address this safeguard because it doesn't make it
clear. It may remove the influence at the company member level but not at
the firm level. We are only referring to partners.

9.

This issue must be dealt with on an individual case basis and it depends
upon many factors.

10.

The definition of immediate family member should include paramour.

We hope this input is of value to you and hope we can offer additional help in the
future.

Sincerely,

Mary Beth Armstrong, CPA, PhD
Chair, Committee on Professional Conduct

cc:

Committee on Professional Conduct
Bruce C. Allen, Director, Government Relations
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Mason & Company, lip
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
ELI MASON, CPA

DAVID GOTTERER, CPA
PETER J. FAIRLEY, CPA, FCA (U.K.)

ROBERT PARKS, CPA

400 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022
(212) 820-6000
FAX: (212) 421-2583

ROBERT GOTTERER, CPA

CORRESPONDENTS IN PRINCIPAL

U.S CITIES AND ABROAD

September 22, 1999

Hon. William T. Allen, Chairman
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
Dear Judge Allen:

This is in response to ISB "Invitation to Comment, Family Relation
ships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client."
I believe that rules pertaining to auditors’ independence should be
concise with no room for subjective interpretation or diversification.
I further believe that the idea of "conceptual framework" will lead to
manipulation, interpretation by convenience and obfuscation. Perhaps,
this is what some may wish and pursue.

Following are my terse and easily comprehensible recommendations
for Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client:
1.

No partner of the firm, no manager of the firm, no staff member
of the firm should have any financial interest in any client of
the firm, direct or indirect.

2.

Every firm engaged in the audit of publicly-held companies should
maintain a current summary of security holdings by all partners,
managers and staff of the audit firm.

3.

The following paragraph should be added to the audit report signed
by the independent auditor, as follows:
"We are independent of
XYZ Company in all respects and have no financial interest in
the company, direct or indirect."

Very truly yours

EM: lf
Copies: ISB
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Ciuni &Panichi
INC

CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

September 27, 1999

Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775

Re: ITC 99-1
Ladies and Gentlemen:

The following represents my comments regarding the above referenced proposal:

I am concerned that the systems-oriented approach to the resolution of independence questions as promulgated
in paragraph 4 is immediately contradicted by the mandates of paragraphs 5 and 6. While I am appreciative of
the attempt in paragraph 7 to bring clarity to the issue, the importance of the firm's own internal system of controls
may be lost with the immediate juxtaposition of absolutes.

Having said that, however, the "on the engagement" alternatives as presented offer clear choices. I favor
Alternative A because of the emphasis on the immediate practice environment. I do not think it is practicable to
"isolate partners" or require additional reviews. To avoid the appearance of lack of independence, audits
involving companies with the family relationships should simply be avoided.
As a side note, I frequently encounter discussions regarding independence that offer peer review as a way of
catching violations. In my thirteen years of peer review experience, I find that to be rare. If a firm is not
forthcoming about issues of independence, it is highly unlikely that the peer reviewers will stumble across them.
My challenge to the Independence Standards Board: how will this be enforced?

Very truly yours,

Co-Chair
NASBA Ethics Committee

F:\cp\misc\indbrd.doc

25201 Chagrin Boulevard, Cleveland, OH 44122-5683
Telephone: 216-831-7171
Fax: 216-831-3020

37 West Broad Street, Columbus, OH 43215-4132
Telephone: 614-241-2200
Fax: 614-241-2202
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NancyK.Ostrowski BankofAmerica Corporate Center, Suite 100
100 North Tryon Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202

September 28, 1999

Independence Standards Board
Attention: ITC 99-1
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775

Gentlemen:
Please find below my comments on ITC 99-1, Family Relationships
Between the Auditor and the Audit Client.

Question 1:
Changes to independence requirements to allow appropriate flexibility for
family relationships given today’s social and economic factors is
mandatory. However, the proposed “any employment” prohibition is far
too restrictive.
Question 2A/B:
Alternative B is far too restrictive. Globalization increasingly demands
personnel concentration in major markets, e.g. New York. This proposal
would place one or the other spouse in a position threatening to their chosen
career and possibly their marriage. It also adds extremely undesirable
characteristics to the public profession of auditing at the highest levels of
the Firms. Effectively, it decreases those firms’ ability to retain top talent
— it’s Partners. In conclusion, alternative B should be soundly and
overwhelmingly rejected.

Question 3:
There is no question that employment-related financial interests are
sufficiently different from other financial interests that they should and can
be addressed separately. In fact, bifurcating the issue is likely to leave
many professionals in limbo until the Conceptual Framework Project is
complete. Generally, many of today’s rules, particularly those related to
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direct financial interests in employment related situations were written
when only beneficiaries of corporate stock options and the like were the top
three to four executives and the number of major audit firms numbered
above ten. The reality is that globalization increases specialization and the
world becomes effectively smaller. Attracting top talent in a specialized
marketplace demands leveraging corporate equity throughout the employee
ranks. Direct financial interests are a way of life and, accordingly, need to
be addressed in the same manner as Alternative A in Question 2.
Controlling direct financial interests should be prohibited.

Question 4:
The definition of “Close Relative” is far too comprehensive particularly as
used in paragraph five of the proposal. Considering the parents of a
sibling’s spouse, their siblings and their respective spouses as close
relatives is far too restrictive and, given today’s trends, not warranted. The
standard would be improved by mandatory disclosure of all specified
family relationships for internal firm evaluation and limiting mandatory
compliance to members of immediate family — children (dependent or
non-dependent), parents, siblings, siblings spouses, and sibling’s children.

Question 5:
The definition of the term “key position” appears reasonable in the
circumstances.
Question 6:
It is not appropriate to prohibit immediate family members from holding
non-sensitive client positions given consolidation trends and narrow
markets. Mandatory disclosure of family relationships upon potential
assignment should be assessed and client staffing addressed accordingly.
Question 7:
Paragraph seven of the proposal provides appropriate guidance.

Independence Standards Board
Page 3

Question 8A:
I can think of few situations where a second firm would be needed to
address an independence concern — certainly at any of the Big 5
considering their size and scale. I can think of no circumstances where this
potential “safeguard” is warranted.
Question 8B:
Appropriate policies and processes for internal consultation are always
appropriate.
Question 9:
The guidance should not be expanded; rather consultative processes are
warranted.

Questions 10 & 11:
The Board should avail itself of experts in the socioeconomic field and
demographic trends to ensure its conclusions reflect not only today’s
conditions, but those likely to be evolving. Additionally, were time
available, a survey of AICPA members on family relationships might prove
beneficial.

Sincerely,

Nancy K. Ostrowski

Author: MIME:badams@scsu.edu at INTERNET
Date:
9/30/99 4:16 PM
Priority: Normal
TO: isb@cpaindependence.org at INTERNET, ISB at AICPA3
Subject: ITC 99-1

The Auditing Class at South Carolina State University would like to submit
the attached res
ponse to the Invitation to Comment ITC 99-1.
This was a class
project.
We appreciate the opportunity to have our comments considered.

Barbara L. Adams, Professor
South Carolina State University
300 College Avenue
Orangeburg, SC 29117
(803) 536-8942
(803) 536-8726 (Fax)
badams@scsu.edu
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SOUTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING
ACCT. 425 - AUDITING CLASS

RESPONSE TO INVITATION TO COMMENT (ITC 99-1)

1.

Do you believe changes are warranted to put more restrictions on those "on the
engagement" by prohibiting any employment by the client?
Response:

We do not believe that this restriction is warranted. The likelihood
That a person who is not in a key position or has a material
investment in the client would influence the audit is rare.

2. Do you believe that the added protection of independence provided by Alternative B’s
covering of this group is sufficient to warrant that extension, and if so, why?

If you support Alternative B, how would "an office" be defined, considering that a
firm might have several locations in or around a large city? Does it matter if the
"office" is managed on a "service-line" or an industry rather than a geographic
basis?
If you prefer Alternative A, do you believe that approach provides appropriate
guidance? Would it be effective instead to isolate partners or to require additional
reviews in these circumstances, or must audits of the companies with the family
relationships just be avoided?

Response:

We support Alternative B and believe that "office" should be
defined based on the structure of the hierarchy of the auditing firm.
If the firm’s hierarchy were organized geographically, an office
would be defined in that manner. On the other hand, if the
hierarchy of the firm is structured based on service or industry line,
then the "office" should be defined in this manner. It would make
a difference how the "office" is defined since a partner in a
particular geographical location that does a significant amount of
the work is unlikely to influence the audit if the assignments and
hierarchy of responsibility is based on industry lines.

Alternative A is too restrictive. If this approach is adopted, it is
believed that the firm should avoid audits of companies with the
family relationships.

3. Should the Board expand the project to consider the inter-relationship of a relative's
employment by a client and the financial interests that flow from that employment,
rather than waiting to treat it as a separate issue?

Response: Yes, we feel that the Board should consider the financial interest and
employment as one issue. If the relative's employment test fails, then the financial
interest test should be applied immediately to avoid all "significant influence"
violations.

4. Is the definition given for "close relative" comprehensive enough or too
comprehensive? Comment.
Response: The definition given for "close relative" is comprehensive enough, but
what about close friends ( for example, fiance, etc.) that may have significant
influence? We realize it may be difficult to establish a rule for such relationships, but
some of these influences are as great or greater than a close relative.

5. Is the definition of the term "key position" (with a client) appropriate? If not, what
would you change?

Response: No. In term of "other individuals with comparable responsibilities," what
responsibilities would make a position a "key position?" Significant influence needs
to be defined.

6. Is it appropriate to prohibit nonsentive positions of immediate family members based
upon a premise that if the job is not appropriate for the auditor, it should not be
appropriate for the spouse?
Response: If a position would not be appropriate for the auditor, it should not be
appropriate for the spouse either, because of the influence that a spouse or other
immediate family may have. The financial gains of the spouse are direct interests of
the auditor. On the other hand, we do not feel that a spouse or other immediate
family member should be eliminated from having a nonsensitive position with a
client. Thus, it should depend upon the type of position that the individual holds.

Do you think the prohibition of any employment by close relatives at a client should
be restricted to those providing audit (attest) services? Why or Why not?

Response: We believe the prohibition of any employment by a close relative at a
client should be restricted to just those providing attest services.
Independence is not an issue with other types of services. Those who
provide other professional services to the client are not likely to influence
those on the audit team; therefore, they should not be restricted from
having relatives employed by the client.
7. Do you believe the guidance provided on when formal consultation might be
presumed for family relationships is appropriate? Are the examples helpful? Can
you suggest additional examples?
Response: We believe the guidance is necessary and appropriate. The examples
provided were helpful, but clarification is needed for point 2 under
paragraph 7. Does the term "close relative" include immediate family
members? There should be more examples.

When people think of a "relative" they think of family members. Non
relatives should also be included as well. For example, non-relatives who
have significant influence on the auditor may be in key positions. This
would require some mitigating controls.

8. Should the proposal refer to potential safeguards when family relationships exist at a
client’s subsidiary? If the use of a separate auditor should overcome an otherwise
prohibition, under what criteria should that occur (e.g. only for immaterial
subsidiaries or certain material ones as well)?

How much help are the safeguards or mitigating factors described in paragraph 15?
Are there additional safeguards, which you believe are important?
Response: Yes, there should be safeguards when family relationships exist at a
client's subsidiary. Safeguards should be established only when
examining a subsidiary that the client has significant influence over, that is
they own 20% or more of the subsidiary's stock. This restriction should be
applied under the consideration of certain conditions. These conditions
include, but are not limited to:

•
•

9.

Clients who have material subsidiaries in which a close relative
is in a key position
The auditor's close relative has a direct financial interest in the
client's subsidiary

Should the proposal be expanded to provide guidance on the effects of death of or
divorce by a relative? If so, what position should that guidance take? If not, why
not?

Response: Yes. The proposal should provide guidance on the effects of death or
divorce of a relative. The guidance should require that each firm to identify present
or past relationship and refer them for consultation and recusal.

10. Are there other broad family relationship models or other key criteria and factors for
evaluating relationships that should be considered?
Response: As indicated previously, we think some consideration should be given to
models that include non-relatives such a fiance', close friend, in-laws, etc. that may
have significant influence over the auditor.

11. Is there research the Board should be made aware of or sponsor to assist in making
informed judgements in these areas? If so, offer recommendations
Response: Determine what relationships and positions have caused the most
problems with independence issues that resulted in lawsuits or had other
damaging effects.
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September 30,1999

Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775

Dear Sirs:
Invitation to Comment (ITC 99-1)
Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client

Body of letter.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the

Invitation to Comment
Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client. Prior to

responding to the questions included with the Invitation To Comment, we
have the following general comments.

1. The existing independence rules and interpretations regarding family
relationships have led to restrictions on the families and relatives of many
individuals employed by accounting firms that audit public companies.
The existing independence rules for family relationships were developed
during an era of single Income families and traditional family relationships
and do not adequately address the social and economic realities of today. It
is our experience that these restrictions on family relationships have
unnecessarily contributed to the migration of many very capable
professionals away from the auditing profession. Therefore, we are
supportive of an approach to independence in this area that gives an
appropriate balance to the possible threats to independence and possible
safeguards that may overcome or mitigate those threats.
2. While we believe that it would be most effective if family relationships
issues could be addressed together with a conceptual framework on
independence and other associated issues, we acknowledge that the
clarification and improvement of the rules relating to family relationships
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cannot wait until the conceptual framework has been developed. However,
the issues relating to family relationships often involve decisions that
change the careers of family members or that involve family members that
are not within the control of the auditor. Interim rule changes could create
undue hardship for many individuals if the rules were changed again in
the near future to conform to a conceptual framework or decisions made
on other aspects of independence such as financial interests held by family
members. Clear and consistent rules would be an improvement but must
include appropriate transitional provisions to prevent undue hardship for
families that previously made career decisions on the basis of rules in
place at the time. Transitional provisions are particularly important when
there is a risk that the rules will be changed again in the near future.

3. The proposed rules should address those aspects of financial interests that
result from the employment of a family member by a client. Stock option
plans, company sponsored retirement plans and other similar
arrangements often are an integral component of compensation and impact
career decisions. Accordingly, both employers and employees would benefit
from the consideration and clarification of these issues.
4. The Invitation To Comment does not define employee or employment.
Individuals can provide services to a single organization, or alternatively to
several organizations, through a variety of full, part time or other
arrangements. Accordingly, It is necessary to include definitions of these
terms.

Our response to the specific questions asked in the Invitation To Comment are
attached.
Very truly yours,

LLP

Attachments
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Invitation to Comment (ITC 99-1)

Attachment

Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client
Responses to Specific Questions

1. The Proposal makes a basic distinction between audit firm personnel "on an
engagement" (broadly defined), and those who are uninvolved, when
determining how family relationships affect auditor independence. Current
SEC rules instead distinguish between “members” (defined as all partners,
all managerial employees in offices performing a significant portion of the
audit, and all individuals providing professional services to a client) and
non-members in judging auditor independence. While the Proposal would
limit the most stringent restrictions to those “on the engagement” generally a smaller group than those considered “members" - it would
strengthen the restrictions that apply to this group (by prohibiting any
employment by the client, as discussed further in Question 6A). as these
individuals are in the best position to influence the outcome of the audit.
Do you believe these changes are warranted?
The independence rules should focus on the relationships of individuals that
are most able to influence the nature and extent of procedures, judgments and
conclusions inherent in the completion of an audit Accordingly, we concur
with the proposedfocus on those “on the engagement". Other comments on
the definition of “on the engagement" are provided in response to other
specific questions below.

We also believe that the restrictions should focus only on those employees that
can influence the financial statements of a client This would include the
directors, officers and those in audit sensitive positions or capable of molding
the financial statements.

2. A The definition in the Appendix of “on an engagement" includes those who
are “likely to influence the audit" and is very important in applying the rule,
and therefore merits significant consideration. Alternative B, while less
inclusive than the existing rules, includes in its scope many partners and
managerial employees of the work office not envisioned in Alternative A. For
example, Alternative B would prohibit a partner whose spouse is CFO of an
audit client being in an office performing a significant portion of that client s
audit engagement, whereas Alternative A would instead require the firm to
assess the likelihood of the partner who is the CFO's spouse influencing the
audit and. if that did not result in prohibition, then to rely on the
consultation, recusal, disclosure and other controls described in paragraph
4 of the Proposal. Do you believe that the added protection of independence
provided by Alternative B’s covering this group is sufficient to warrant that
extension, and if so, why?
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Attachment

Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client
Responses to Specific Questions

B. If you support Alternative B, how would "an office" be defined,
considering that a firm might have several locations in or around a large
city? Does it matter if the “office" is managed on a “service-line” or an
“industry” rather than a "geographic" basis?
C. If you instead prefer Alternative A, it suggests that all partners in a small
office or practice unit might be considered as being likely to influence the
audit. Do you believe that approach provides appropriate guidance? Would
it be effective instead to isolate partners or to require additional reviews in
these circumstances, or must audits of the companies with the family
relationships just be avoided?
We recommend that the definition of “on the engagement'' be based on
Alternative A. We believe that Alternative A together with the additional
limitations for managerial employees and the requirements for consultation,
recusal and disclosure would provide adequate protection from threats to
independence.

3. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the ITC describe the inter-relationship of a relative's
employment by a client and. the financial interests that flow from that
employment. The Board, however, has tentatively chosen to defer
consideration of job-related financial interests of relatives until the broader
subject of financial interests can be reconsidered in its entirety. The basis
for this tentative decision is that the question of permissible financial
interests in a client is a major subject in its own right and has aspects
broader than those of this project. Further, it is likely that resolution of
that topic could benefit from the conclusions of the Board's in-process
Conceptual Framework project.

The Board therefore asks whether a resolution of the employment issues
raised in this Invitation to Comment, without dealing with the explicit
financial interests that may come with that employment, will provide useful
guidance. Alternatively, you may want to encourage the Board to expand
the project, recognizing that doing so could delay issuance of any standard and. of course, with no commitment as to how the Board would decide on
such issues. Are the issues sufficiently different that the Board should now
take up employment-related financial interests separately from other
financial interests? Please describe the reasons for your conclusions.
Our views on establishing independence rules family relationships in advance

of the consideration of a conceptualframework or rules for financial interests
are outlined in our covering letter.
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Attachment

Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client
Responses to Specific Questions

Many employment arrangements potentially create financial interests such as
through stock option and stock ownership plans, compensationfor future
periods and stock based retirement plans. Accordingly, we believe it is
imperative to establish independence rules for employment related financial
interests. Without such consideration, much of the guidance that would be
developed with regard to employment positions would be inoperative in many
family situations. We note that while the Invitation to Comment purports not to
address financial interests, the proposed rules include reference to
investments and otherforms offinancial interests in several paragraphs (e.g.
paragraphs 6 and 7).

4. "Close relative" is defined in the Appendix. Is that definition comprehensive
enough, or too comprehensive?
The definition of close relative should be limited to immediate family members,
brothers, sisters, parents and grandparents. Possible threats to independence
resulting from other relatives should be addressed through consultation,
recusal and disclosure.

5. Do you believe the definition of the term "key position" (with a client) is
appropriate? If not, what would you change?
We interpret the proposed definition of "key position" to be much broader than
the corresponding concepts that currently exist and to be unnecessarily broad.
We recommend that the definition of key position be limited to individuals that
are involved in establishing policy, exercising judgements that affect the
financial statements or comprise a substantive part of key internal control
processes.

The definition of a "key position” should also be improved to clarify the
following points:
•

•

Is it intended that the qualifier "sensitivefinancial position” be applied to
both officers and employers or is it intended that dll officers be considered
to be in key positions?
What is the intended definition of an officer? We believe the definition for
officers should focus on those that are required to be disclosed in the
proxy and those individuals that have a direct effect on the financial
statements. For example, we would not propose that all officers in a bank
be included in the definition of officers affected by these rules.
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Attachment

Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client
Responses to Specific Questions

•

•

Is it intended that underwriters be included as key positions only for those
periods during which they served as underwriters, or for some other longer
of time? We recommend that underwriters be considered to be in key
positions only for the periods during which they served the client.
Is the reference to an underwriter intended to includejust those employees
of an organization that are directly involved in the provision of services to a
client, or is it intended to include all employees of the underwriters? We
recommend that the reference to underwriters should be clarified to include
only those individuals that are involved in the services provided to the
client.

6. Under the Proposal’s paragraph 5, the immediate family of those on the
engagement would not be permitted to have any employment by the client.
Under existing rules, employment of an immediate family member is
permitted unless the position is either audit sensitive or capable of molding
the financial statements. Would it be appropriate to prohibit nonsensitive
jobs based upon a premise that if the job is not appropriate for the auditor,
then it also should not be appropriate for the spouse? While all those who
provide any professional service to the client are defined to be "on the
engagement." some would suggest that it would be adequate for this extra
prohibition of any employment at the client to be limited to just those who
provide audit (attest) services. What are your views and why? (Note that
the impact of any conclusion could vary significantly depending on your
view as to Question 2A.)
The limitations on employment should be limited to those positions that are
audit sensitive or capable of molding the financial statements. Employment by
family members in many non-sensttlve positions would not create real threats
to independence. We recognize that the issue offinancial interests resulting
from employment is equally applicable to non-sensitive positions and,
accordingly, recommend these issues be addressed as part of this process.
The definition of “on an engagement" should include all individuals providing
professional assurance services to the client or immediatefamily members of
partners providing other professional services to the client.
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Attachment

Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client
Responses to Specific Questions

7. Paragraph 7 of the Proposal provides guidance on when formal firm
consultation might be presumed for family relationship situations. Do you
believe this guidance is appropriate, and that the examples are helpful
instances of when such consulting should occur? Are there other examples
you believe should be included?
We believe it would be an improvement to draw a bright line as to when formal
firm consultation is required. For example, there should be required
consultation when there is a potential threat to independence from the
employment status of a close relative.

8. A. Some believe that when certain family relationships exist at a client’s
subsidiary level, a significant safeguard can be provided by having a
different accounting firm audit that subsidiary. This potential safeguard
has not been described in the Proposal. Should the Proposal refer to this
possible safeguard and, if so, how? For example, should that safeguard just
be among those to be considered in the firm’s overall evaluation of the
family relationship or, in certain fact patterns, should its use be permitted
to overcome an otherwise required prohibition? If the use of a separate
auditor should overcome an otherwise prohibition, under what criteria
should that occur (e.g., only for immaterial subsidiaries, or certain material
ones as well)?
We believe that the involvement of other auditors should provide adequate
safeguards for relationships at a client's subsidiary level. The involvement of
a separate firm of auditors would be a very effective ‘‘mitigating factor” for
associated threats to independence.

If this concept is adopted, it would be necessary to consider whether a family
relationship could exist without impairing independence, with an individual at
a parent company of the client as long as the parent is audited by a separate
firm. Threats to independence could arise if the individual at the parent
company was responsible for, or otherwise associated with, the performance
of the subsidiary. However, employment in many other positions would not
create threats to independence.
The rules should also provide concessions for immaterial subsidiaries in other
countries and domestic immaterial subsidiaries that are operationally separate
from the parent Family relationships between an auditor of the parent
company and an employee of a separate and immaterial subsidiary would not
cause threats to independence that could not be addressed through
consultation processes. Similar concessions should also be applicable for
employees of other immaterial investees of the parent such as Joint ventures
and investments subject to significant influence.
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Attachment

Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client
Responses to Specific Questions

B. Of how much help are the other safeguards, or "mitigating factors,"
described in paragraph 15 of the ITC? Are there additional safeguards
which you believe are important?
The existing and proposed rules cast a wide net over all relationships thatfall
within certain definitions in an attempt to capture all circumstances that could
cause potential threats to independence. We believe that consultation with
appropriate professionals (not directly related to engagement and
knowledgeable in independence matters) together with appropriate controls
should provide sufficient safeguards against possible threats to independence
in many cases, particularly for close relatives that are not immediate family
members. We note thatfor such controls to be seen to be effective, the
consultation and implementation of any controls would need to be completed
as early as possible.
Consideration should also be given to many other "mitigating factors"
embodied in existing professional standards such as concurring partner
reviews and peer reviews.

9. Paragraph 16 of the ITC discusses “the effects of death of, or divorce by, a
relative.” although these events are not currently mentioned in the
Proposal. Should the Proposal be expanded to provide guidance in such
situations? If so, what positions should that guidance take? If not, why
not?
We believe that the following principles should be adopted with respect to
death and divorce.
•

A death or divorce of a spouse is presumed to terminate any associated
close relative relationships. Any unique circumstances should be
considered through the process offormal evaluation and consultation..

•

A divorce should be presumed to terminate any associated relationship
with a spouse unless there is a continuing material financial interest such
as through significant alimony or child support payments.
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Attachment

Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client
Responses to Specific Questions

10. Are there other broad family relationship models, or other key criteria and
factors for evaluating relationships, which the Board should consider?
We do not have

any additional recommendations for models or criteria that
assist in evaluating family relationships.

11.Is there research that the Board should be made aware of or should sponsor
to assist it in making informed judgments in these areas? If so, please offer
recommendations.
We are

not aware of any research that the Board should be made aware of.
We also are not aware of any research that establishes a significant
correlation between alleged auditfailures and family relationships.
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1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775

ITC 99-1
Dear Board:

Below are my responses to the questions outlined in ITC 99-1, Family Relationships Between the
Auditor and the Audit Client. I am responding as an interested party in the public accounting field and
not on behalf of the firm at which I am employed. Thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts
on this proposal.

Sincerely,

W. Bryan Buckler
CPA

Independence Standards Board
September 30, 1999
Page 2
1. Yes. All professionals on an engagement (“engagement professionals”) should be restricted as to
any and all financial and personal (i.e., close relative) relationships with personnel at their client which
might influence their judgment. However, a professional who is not on an engagement should not be
limited as to the relationships he can have with employees of a client as long as he does not exert
influence over engagement professionals (and thus impairing engagement professional’s judgment).
As long as all relationships are clearly documented and understood by the firm, appropriate measures
could be taken. It is very important that these measures include prohibiting the engagement
professionals from being supervised, reviewed or mentored by the professional with the relationship.
2. A.
No.
B.
N/A - Alternative A supported
C.
Certain offices are so small that the Partner would have to either be involved with the client or
with other professionals on the engagement. In these cases, anyone in this office could be considered
likely to influence the audit. The Board should consider determining the size of office thresholds.
However, in a larger office, where professionals often do not even know other professionals within
their unit or have contact with them on limited basis at firm-wide social or educational events, the
requirement of additional reviews/controls would be appropriate and effective. In addition, the
relationship should be documented by the firm, and boundaries periodically discussed with the
Partner/Senior Manager in question and the engagement professionals. This discussion should be led
by a senior partner designated by a firm’s national office.
Independent auditors and accounting firms are asked to make professional judgments all the
time. In this case, it is also appropriate that the firms judge which relationships impair their
independence (within certain boundaries set by the ISB).

Independence Standards Board
September 30, 1999
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3. Yes, the issues are sufficiently different that the Board should take up employment-related financial
interests separately from other financial interests. The standards on financial interests currently
provide enough guidance that should Alternative A be adopted, the Partner’s immediate family
member or close relative could take up employment and follow the current guidelines (i.e. the current
financial interest guidelines do not in themselves make employment impossible and they appear to
provide adequate limitations). Further, I believe that the financial limitations set by the board remain
appropriate for immediate family members. If the Partner’s spouse were to hold a material portion of
the couple’s joint net worth in equity of the Company, the Partner would then have a interest in the
Company and not be independent.
4. The definition is appropriate, however, exceptions should be allowed for under certain •
circumstances as judged by the firm.
5. The definition is appropriate.
6. A professional should not be on the engagement of any client at which an immediate family
member is employed. The engagement professional must be independent of his client. An immediate
family member employed in any capacity might impair this independence. Furthermore, under
Alternative A, the professional could be removed from the engagement but still be employed with the
firm in that office.
7. Yes, the guidance is appropriate.
8. A. If said immediate family member was in a “key position”, even at a subsidiary, then in no
circumstances should it be permissible for an auditor to be on the engagement. This situation would
not effect an auditor at a firm who had no ties to the engagement under Alternative A.
B. No Opinion as Paragraph 15 could not be located.
9. I do not believe that the proposal should be expanded to provide guidance in such situations.
However, each firm should have in place a control structure in which these situations are discussed and
documented among the appropriate firm members to evaluate the independence of the auditor.
10. Not to my knowledge.
11. Not to my knowledge.

Author: MIME:jcarcell@utk.edu at INTERNET
Date:
9/30/99 7:13 PM
Priority: Normal
TO: isb@cpaindependence.org at INTERNET, ISB at AICPA3
Subject: Comments on ITC 99-1

Art, Rick, and Susan:

Attached are my comments on ITC 99-1.
these issues.

Good luck as you continue to debate

Joe Carcello

Joseph V. Carcello, Ph.D., CPA, CMA, CIA
Department of Accounting and Business Law
University of Tennessee
601 Stokely Management Center
Knoxville, TN 37996-0560
Phone:

Fax:

(423)

(423)

974-1757

974-4631
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Date:

September 30, 1999

To:

Independence Standards Board

From:

Joseph V. Carcello

Subject:

Response to ITC 99-1

I have read ITC 99-1, "Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client."
Before responding to the questions posed at the end of the document, some general
observations are in order. First, it was not clear to me that a problem exists. What
evidence does the ISB have indicating that the existing independence guidelines in this
area are inadequate? The problem might be that existing independence guidance in this
area is too restrictive given the growth in dual-career families, and hence the possible rise
in family relationships between the auditor and audit client. However, the motivation for
tackling this issue was not clear to me and, in my view, providing such rationale for
standards helps to engender confidence both in the standards and the standard setter.

I have recently co-authored a study on fraudulent financial reporting for COSO.
Although not one of the objectives of our study, I cannot recall a single incident where
there was a family relationship between the auditor and senior level personnel at the audit
client. (Since we did not gather this information, I may be mistaken but, at a minimum,
this was certainly not a pervasive problem.) There was a problem, however, in that
family relationships between directors and/or officers were reasonably common among
fraud companies. There was evidence of one or more family relationships (of the type
just described) for almost 40 percent of the fraud companies for which we had access to
proxy filings. Although I recognize that the ISB has no control over such relationships
among boards and/or among senior management, this issue may need further study by
other regulators and standards setters.
Question 1 addresses the tradeoffs implicit in the proposal outlined in ITC 99-1. The
proposal would limit the most stringent rules to "those on the engagement," a smaller
class of individuals than "members" (all partners, all managerial employees in offices
performing a significant portion of the audit, and all individuals providing professional
services to the client) as currently defined in SEC regulations. However, the proposal
would strengthen independence requirements by prohibiting any employment with the
client by family members of those individuals on the engagement.
In my view, the SEC's current definition of a member is too broad. I have difficulty

envisioning any independence-related threat if the child of a partner in a Big 5 firm in
Seattle is the CFO of a Miami-based company audited by that same Big 5 firm. I just
believe that the geographic scope and size of certain accounting firms is so large that to
extend prohibitions on family relationships to all partners is too broad.
However, as discussed in my response to Question 6, I also do not favor prohibiting any
employment with the client by family members of those on the engagement. I think such
a prohibition is too restrictive and, in my view, an adequate case has not been made to
tighten the rules that already exist in this area.
Question 2 addresses which of two alternatives is more appropriate for defining those
individuals — other than those who work directly on the audit -- who are likely to
influence the audit. The essential difference between the two alternatives is that
Alternative B would classify — as those who are likely to influence the audit — those
partners and managerial employees who work in an office that performs a significant
portion of the engagement. Alternative A would not classify such individuals as likely to
influence the audit.
I struggled greatly with this issue. Good arguments can clearly be made in favor of both
alternatives. I favor Alternative B. In my view, partners and managerial employees who
work in an office that performs a significant portion of the engagement are potentially
close enough — both in proximity and, in some cases, based on relationships - to
influence those individuals who work directly on the audit engagement.

You also ask how to define the ’’office" if we support Alternative B. The office would be
defined as the primary office in a city and any satellite offices that are essentially
subsumed into the primary office by the firm's internal management system.
Question 3 addresses whether family relationships between the auditor and audit client
can be effectively considered separately from financial interests that the auditor may have
in the audit client. Although there clearly is some overlap between these issues, I believe
that the issues are distinct enough to address employment-related family relationships
separately.

Question 4 addresses the definition of a close relative provided in the document. The
definition of a close relative is reasonable — it is not excessively broad, nor is it too
narrow. There are certainly instances where parents and (adult) children are not close,
when siblings are not close, etc. There also are circumstances where an individual might
be very close to an uncle or aunt (not considered a close relative per ITC 99-1). The
factors that affect the "closeness" of human relationships are many and complex. As
such, it would be impractical to try to capture all of these variables in some type of
formula-based approach to measuring closeness that could lead to a general-purpose rule.
The only reasonable alternative is the one adopted in ITC 99-1 — that is, defining a close
relative in a manner that would capture (albeit with some error) the family relationships
that would normally be expected to be close.

Question 5 addresses the definition of a key person with the client. This definition is
reasonable.

Question 6 addresses whether the prohibition against the immediate family of those on an
audit engagement having any employment with the client is too strict. I believe that this
aspect of ITC 99-1 is too strict.
As stated in ITC 99-1, under existing rules, employment of an immediate family member
is permitted unless the position is either audit sensitive or could lead to a shaping of the
financial statements. I believe that the existing rule is reasonable and adequate,
particularly given the failure of ITC 99-1 to document significant problems with the
independence rules that are already in place.
Question 7 addresses whether it is appropriate to handle situations that may be gray situations that are on the edge of being problematic — via a requirement for internal firm
consultation. I believe that this recommendation is adequate and prudent, and that the
examples given of circumstances that would require consultation are reasonable.
Question 8 addresses whether a potentially problematic family relationship at a subsidiary
could be resolved by having a different audit firm examine the subsidiary. I have no
opinion on this recommendation.

Question 9 addresses whether the proposed guidance should address the independencerelated effects due to the death of, or divorce by, a relative. Given the non-trivial rate of
divorce in the U.S., I believe that it is important to incorporate such guidance into the
final standard. The form such guidance should take is obviously more problematic.
Factors that the ISB might consider include: (1) the length of the relationship before
death or divorce, (2) whether children are part of the relationship terminated by death or
divorce, (3) physical distance between the parties, both during the time of the relationship
and currently. Other factors might be equally or more persuasive.

14

PriCewATeRHOUsecOOPERS

September 30, 1999

Mr. Arthur Siegel
Executive Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775

Dear Mr. Siegel:
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the
Independence Standards Board’s (ISB or Board) Invitation to Comment 99-1, Family
Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client, (ITC 99-1). The existing
independence rules governing this subject have been in need of reexamination for some
time. We welcome the opportunity to participate in the ISB’s deliberative process in an
effort to establish guidance that appropriately addresses the threats to independence that
arise from family relationships between the auditor and the audit client.
The comments in this letter have been developed from the perspective of our firm as an
ISB constituent. As you know, PwC’s chief executive officer, James J. Schiro, is a
member of the ISB. In carrying out his responsibilities as a board member, Mr. Schiro
intends to fully exercise objectivity with a view to helping the ISB to reach conclusions
on this project that are in the best interests of independence standard-setting and the
investing public. The comments in this letter have been developed consistent with that
goal but should not be viewed as necessarily indicative of Mr. Schiro’s personal views
and do not serve to bind him to any particular thought process in his role as an ISB
member.
General Comments

The ISB has approached the subject of family relationships between the auditor and the
audit client by analyzing the threats to independence that might arise from such
relationships and proposing the development of guidelines to address those threats.
Paragraph 11 of the Discussion section in ITC 99-1 sets forth the threats and provides, in
part:
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Specifically, the concerns are that independence could be considered to be
impaired by an auditor

•
•
•

•

effectively auditing his own (family’s) work,
having financial interests or other mutual interests in the outcome of the audit,
conveying information to the client relative to compromise the firm’s audit
approach or ability to consult effectively, or
receiving critical comments from the relative about an assigned staff person,
the threat of which could weaken the staff person’s effectiveness.

We believe that an assessment of potential threats is a useful way to approach this
subject. In assessing the concerns described above, we do not believe that the last two
are substantive. In particular, the threat of receiving critical comments from a relative
regarding a staff person’s performance does not seem substantially different from
receiving the same type of comments from a non-relative. Critical comments received
from a client (whether from a relative or non-relative) would, in our opinion, weaken a
staff person’s effectiveness to the same degree.

We agree with the ISB that a potential threat involving family relationships is
encompassed in the first two bullets, i.e., auditing the work performed by the
relative/employee and being in a situation in which the outcome of the audit would affect
the financial interests of the relative/employee. We have summarized these threats below
and believe that both condition (1) and either condition (2) (a) or (2) (b) must exist for
auditor independence to be threatened:
(1) the individual in the audit firm who is related to the relative/employee
participates in the audit, and
(2) (a) the relative/employee’s work is subject to audit, would serve as audit
evidence, or would otherwise be relied upon during the conduct of the audit,

or

(b) the relative/employee has a material financial interest in the audit client.

Paragraph 1 in the Proposal section of ITC 99-1 mentions a desire of the auditor to
“protect a relative of a colleague” as a concern that also could exist. We question the
validity of this notion. Accepting inappropriate accounting or ignoring an error that is
attributable to a close relative of the auditor is a potential threat. However, the auditor
who chooses this approach would do so at great risk to the client, himself1, and his firm.
While he may be willing to accept that risk for a close relative, we find it difficult to
1 The terms “he,” “him,” or “himself’ are meant to also connote the feminine “she," "her,” and “herself.”.
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imagine that he would be willing to do so for someone else’s relative, even if that
someone else is his partner.
The conditions we’ve outlined above contemplate that the “engagement” is the audit
engagement. This would eliminate the need to provide guidance for situations in which
an individual with the family relationship is not on the audit. If that person does not
participate in the audit, condition (1) described above would not be met and thus the
individual would not be in a position to evaluate the results of the rclative/employee’s
work or influence the audit for the benefit of the relative/employee’s financial interest.
Accordingly, there should be no threat to independence as a result of a family
relationship of an individual who is not on the audit.

We recognize that there can be instances in which it may not be readily apparent whether
an individual in the firm is on the audit. One test that could be applied to make that
determination is whether the individual’s work will be relied upon in conducting the
audit.

We also believe that any new rules in this area that are promulgated by the Board should
apply prospectively with an appropriate transition period for individuals who may
currently be in compliance with existing rules, but will need to take action to be in
compliance with new rules that become effective. For instance, an independence
impairment would exist under the Proposal where the brother of a managerial employee
who is on the audit is employed by an audit client in a position that is not audit sensitive
and does not enable him to mold the shape of the financial statements. Under existing
rules, such an arrangement would be permitted. Companies in these situations would
need a reasonable period of time to react to any changes that need to be made. Thus, we
encourage the ISB to include in the Proposal a discussion of transition.

Questions for which Comments are Requested
Below are our responses to the specific questions for which the ISB has requested
comments.

7.

The Proposal would apply the most stringent restrictions to those who are "on the
engagement ” (generally a smaller group than those who are considered "members ”)
and would apply more restrictive rules to that group by prohibiting any employment
by the client of an immediate family member of someone "on the engagement” as
these individuals are in the best position to influence the outcome of the audit. Do
you believe these changes are warranted?

We believe that threats to independence may arise when individuals who participate in
the audit or have an ability to influence the conduct of the audit must audit the results of
work performed by a relative/employee or audit an employer/client in which the
relative/employee has a material financial interest Accordingly, we believe those
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individuals should be required to be independent of the audit client and we would support
guidance that makes a distinction between those who are “on the audit” and those who
are not. This is different from the proposal, which distinguishes between those who are
“on the engagement” and those who are not and defines the term “engagement” broadly
to include any professional services engagement, not just the audit. It is difficult to see
how an individual providing non-audit services to the client could be among those who
are “in the best position to influence the outcome of the audit.” Thus, we disagree with a
distinction based on such a broad definition and recommend that the proposal be revised
to include only firm personnel providing audit or other attest services to the audit client.
“On the engagement” should mean “on the audit.”
We also recommend that the ISB eliminate the present approach contained in the
proposal that would automatically apply more restrictive rules to those who are “on the
engagement.” Consistent with our general comments above, we believe that employment
positions that potentially threaten auditor independence are those where the
relativc/employee’s work is subject to audit, would serve as audit evidence, or would
otherwise be relied upon during the conduct of the audit. Under the proposal, it is
irrelevant what position an immediate family member holds with the auditor’s audit
client; any position would be sufficient to impair the auditor’s independence if he is “on
the engagement.” We believe that a reasonable investor would conclude that an auditor’s
independence is not impaired simply because, for example, his son takes a summer job
with the client working on the client’s loading docks, or because his daughter works parttime as an assistant in the client’s graphic arts department. Using the definition in the
proposal of “on the engagement” makes the proposal even more difficult to understand.
For example, under the Proposal, a firm’s independence would be impaired if a first-year
staff person in the firm's Management Consulting Services group participates on a
consulting project for subsidiary X, an immaterial subsidiary of the audit client, and his
spouse is a secretary in the human resources department at subsidiary Y. It is difficult to
understand how this impairs the firm’s independence. Even under the guidance proposed
in the ITC, none of the concerns described in paragraph 11 would appear to exist in this
situation.

We recommend that the Proposal provide for the firm to assess the nature of the work
performed by the immediate family member of the individual who will participate in the
audit. If the immediate family member’s work would be subject to audit, serve as audit
evidence, or otherwise be relied upon by the auditor in the conduct of the audit, then the
individual should be precluded from participating in the audit.
2. A. Do you believe that the added protection of independence provided by Alternative
B, which would extend independence restrictions to many partners and managers located
in the work office that would not be included in Alternative A, is sufficient to warrant that
extension?
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We are not convinced that any added protection would result from such an extension.
Unless the partner or manager with the family relationship is participating in the audit or
has the ability to influence the audit by providing the audit team with consultation,
supervision, quality control, or other oversight, we do not believe they are “likely to
influence the audit” (even in a small office as contemplated by Alternative A). In fact,
we assert that in most cases they would not even have the ability to do so. This would be
especially true in large offices where partners of different disciplines are resident and
there can be hundreds of partners in a single office. (However, refer to our response to
Question 2B below regarding the definition of an office.) Moreover, we believe that the
recusal provisions of paragraph 4 of the Proposal would adequately address situations in
which a partner or manager with a family relationship is located in an office (large or
small) that participates in a significant portion of the audit.
If the ISB believes that ail partners and managers located in an office that participates in a
significant portion of the audit are “likely to influence the audit,” it will be important for
the Board to set forth the basis for this conclusion so that we and other constituents can
address it in subsequent communications. It also would be important to reconcile that
with the recusal provisions in paragraph 4. It would seem that selection of Alternative B
would significantly reduce the effectiveness of those provisions.

2. B. Ifyou support Alternative B. how would "an office" be defined considering that a
firm might have several locations in or around a large city? Does it matter if the
" office" is managed on a "service-line" or an "industry" rather than a "geographic"
basis?

We do not support Alternative B. As for the definition of “an office,” we believe that the
typical meaning of an office that is embodied in the existing rules (i.e., a physical
location) should be supplemented by the structural safeguards that are inherent in how
firms operate today, especially the larger ones. Many firms operate on a practice unit
basis, which may be either service-line or industry based. Such units represent a sub
division of a firm’s practice within which a team of partners and staff operate closely. In
addition, personnel assigned to a practice unit will serve clients on a regional and
sometimes national basis and are not confined to serving clients that are served primarily
by the office they happen to be located in. In fact, they may never serve clients that are
typically thought of as “ ’X’ office’s clients.” Moreover, some personnel are not even
assigned to a physical office but work almost exclusively at client sites, various offices
within a firm on a “hotelling” basis, or at home.
Thus, while an appropriate safeguard can still involve location in an office different than
the one that performs the audit (depending on the facts and circumstances), we believe
that safeguard is enhanced when that individual’s practice unit responsibilities effectively
distance him from the audit and the audit team. Such facts and circumstances should be
considered as part of the consultation required by paragraph 4 of the ITC to determine the
degree of threat that is posed by a family relationship.
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2. C. Ifyou instead prefer Alternative A, it suggests that all partners in a small office or
practice unit might be considered as being likely to influence the audit. Do you believe
that approach provides appropriate guidance? Would it be effective instead to isolate
partners or to require additional reviews in these circumstances, or must audits of the
companies with the family relationship just be avoided?
It would be helpful if the ISB defined what constitutes a small office or provided
guidance to assist practitioners in making that determination. Without that guidance, a
small firm with only one office could have difficulty determining whether they fall into
the exception in Alternative A. Having said that, we support Alternative A except that
we do not agree that all partners in a small office might be considered as likely to
influence the audit. As stated in our response to Question 2.A., unless a partner is
participating in the audit or provides the audit team with consultation, supervision,
quality control, or other oversight, we do not believe he is likely to influence the audit.
Moreover, in light of the ISB’s approach of identifying threats that pose the highest risks
to auditor independence, restrictions such as avoiding audits or isolating all partners in a
small practice office may cause undue burden on audit clients and the relatives of the
partners in that office. Although these situations should be highlighted, discussed with,
and reviewed by appropriate individuals in the firm, it is difficult to justify why such
relationships should be automatically prohibited based solely on the size of the office.

An effective way to address any threat that might arise in a small (or large) office
situation is to apply the recusal provisions of the ITC. Under those provisions, firms
would isolate the individual with the family relationship from any involvement with the
client, including inappropriate contact with any individuals involved in the engagement.
Although it is not clear what contact would be considered “inappropriate,” we assume the
Board contemplates assigning the individual with the family relationship to an
engagement in which he will work with members of the audit team who serve the client
where his relative is employed. However, we recommend the ISB provide examples or
other guidance to assist practitioners in making this assessment and limit confusion over
what is inappropriate.
3. The Board has tentatively chosen to defer consideration ofjob-relatedfinancial
interests of relatives until the broader subject offinancial interests can be reconsidered
in its entirety. The Board asks whether a resolution of the employment issues raised in
this ITC, without dealing with the explicitfinancial interests that may come with that
employment, will provide useful guidance. Are the issues sufficiently different that the
Board should now take up employment-relatedfinancial interests separately from other
financial interests?

We strongly urge the ISB to address as part of this project family relationship issues
involving financial interests in an employer/audit client that a relative may have as a
result of such employment. It is quite common today for employees to own financial
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interests in their employer. Such interests may arise from participation in profit sharing
plans, stock purchase plans, stock option plans, 401(k) plans, and stock bonus
arrangements. These plans and arrangements often are a normal part of how companies
compensate their employees. In our view, that makes such interests sufficiently different
from all other financial interests in audit clients that arise absent an employment
relationship. Moreover, an inability to participate in these programs because of
independence restrictions means that the relative/employce must forego a significant part
of their compensation because most employers are usually not willing to substitute cash
in lieu of such participation. Thus, addressing only whether the relative’s position with
the employer/audit client is problematic deals with only half of the issue that may arise
when an audit client employs a relative.
We believe that if a partner or staff person is “on the audit,” their relative/employee
should not own material employment-related financial interests in the audit client. If the
partner or staff person is not on the audit, their relative/employee should be permitted to
own employment-related financial interests without regard to materiality.

While the Board’s question pertains only to employment-related financial interests, we
urge the Board to consider the independence implications of financial interests held by
relatives in audit clients absent an employment relationship with the audit client. Under
today’s rules, there is a presumption of impairment of independence when certain
nondependent close relatives of the auditor have material financial interests in an audit
client. So, for example, if a partner knows that a relative owns a material financial
interest in an audit client of his firm, independence is required to be safeguarded through
the achievement of adequate geographic separation between the partner and the relative
and the partner and audit team. This is without regard to whether the partner participates
in the audit or otherwise influences the conduct of the audit. We believe that should be
an important assessment prior to requiring any action to be taken to mitigate any threat.
And, most would agree that a safeguard that is based entirely on how far apart the
relatives are does little to address the threat, if any, that may exist in such situations.
4. Is the definition of "close relative ” comprehensive enough, or too comprehensive?
We do not object to the comprehensiveness of the definition. However, the last part of
the definition refers to “the member.” We assume that this is not meant to connote
“member” as defined in the SEC’s independence rule. Clarification of this point could be
made by changing the word to “partner or staff member.”

5. Do you believe the definition of the term "key position ” (with a client) is
appropriate?

We believe that clarification is needed to ensure that readers will understand what is
meant by “sensitive financial position.” Is this meant to be similar to the AICPA’s
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We also recommend that the examples include an instance where an immediate family
member is employed by the client and the related partner or staff person is not on the
engagement.
In addition, use of the word “with” when discussing investments has the potential to be
misread as investments “in” the client rather than “with” the client. The existing SEC
rule, Section 602.02.h ofthe Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, uses “with” in
a similar fashion2. We recommend revising paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 to clarify that the
investment contemplated is one that is made together with the client (not in the client) as
in a joint investment.

Finally, paragraph 8 refers to “direct or indirect control” of a client by a close relative of
a partner or immediately family member of a staff person. We believe the Board should
clarify what is meant by “direct or indirect control.” This appears similar to the
definition of control contained in SEC Regulation S-X. Thus, it might include instances
in which a relative/employee owns greater than 50% of the voting stock of the client.
However, because the Proposal lias been written without regard to a relative/employee’s
financial interests in the employer/client, it may more appropriately contemplate control
of the entity through contract or otherwise. Clarification and examples would be useful.
8. A. Should the Proposal refer to the possible safeguard of having a different
accountingfirm audit a subsidiary where a family relationship exists? Should such a
safeguard be considered in a firm's evaluation of the relationship or should its use he
permitted to overcome an otherwise required prohibition and under what criteria should
that occur (e.g., only for immaterial subsidiaries, or certain material ones as well)?

We believe the Proposal should refer to the possible safeguard of having a different firm
audit a subsidiary where a family relationship exists. We also believe that this safeguard
should be considered in a firm’s overall evaluation of the threats that may arise from such
a relationship. Moreover, use of a different accounting firm in that situation should be
permitted to overcome those threats, regardless of whether the subsidiary is material to
the consolidated financial statements. In all situations, the other auditor who reports on
the separate subsidiary should take full responsibility for the audit of the subsidiary’s
financial statements. Reference to that auditor should be made by the principal auditor
when reporting on the consolidated financial statements, and the other auditor’s report
should accompany the statements. Under these conditions, we believe that financial
statement users will clearly understand the degree of responsibility each auditor has
assumed.

2 The first sentence of Lhc second paragraph of 602.02.h states: “There would also be a presumption of impairment of
independence when other close relatives of the accountant have material financial interests or business relationships or
hold important positions with a client.”
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8. B. How much help are the other safeguards, or "mitigatingfactors, ” described in
paragraph 15 ofthe ITC? Are there additional safeguards that you believe are
important?

We believe that the safeguards described in the Proposal are helpful; however, they
should be expanded. For example, the Proposal does not mention the safeguard that is
inherent in the various levels of review that take place during an audit. The work of
individuals on an audit is subject to a number of reviews by persons higher than the
individual who performed the work. And, concurring review partners provide additional
assurance that audits are performed in accordance with professional standards by
providing an independent review of all significant audit issues. Consulting on difficult
accounting, audit, or independence issues usually involves senior partners (in the large
firms, these partners are typically national office partners) who are otherwise unaffiliated
with the audit. Internal work inspections are performed annually by firm members who
are not connected with either the office performing the audit or the audit itself. And,
external peer reviews are performed by another firm triennially to independently evaluate
the mechanisms in place to ensure audit quality. All of these control procedures serve as
safeguards that mitigate perceived threats to independence that might arise from family
relationships.
9.

Should the Proposal be expanded to provide guidance for situations involving death
or divorce of a relative? What positions should that guidance take?

We believe there is no critical need for guidance on this topic at the present time. As
suggested in paragraph 16, the facts and circumstances of a particular case would need to
be carefully analyzed to reach a judgment about whether such events eliminate the threats
to independence that might arise from specific family relationships.
10. Are there other broadfamily relationship models, or other key criteria andfactors
for evaluating relationships, which the Board should consider?
The Board may wish to study various models presently employed in the federal
government to enable government employees to avoid conflicts when carrying out their
responsibilities.

11. Is there research that the Board should be made aware of or should sponsor to assist
it in making informedjudgments in these areas?

** TOTAL PAGE.12 **
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It may be useful to sponsor research to test the tentative conclusions in a final proposal.
For example, we have argued that we believe a reasonable investor would conclude that
an auditor’s independence is not impaired simply because his son takes a summer job
with the client working on the client’s loading docks. The Board may wish to test this
(and other views) with investor groups and those who have fiduciary responsibilities to
shareholders, such as audit committee members.
It also may be helpful to the Board to conduct research into the structure and operation of
a practice unit versus a practice office to gain a more complete understanding of the
inherent separation that occurs in a practice unit structure.
*

*

*

We appreciate the opportunity to express our views and would be please to discuss them
with you in detail. If you have questions, please contact Robert H. Herz. (973-236-7217)
or Kenneth E. Dakdduk (212-596-7140).
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advisors

16th Floor

Wilmington, DE 19801

September 30, 1999

William T. Allen, Chairman
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of Americas 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036
Attn: ITC 99-1

Dear Mr. Allen:
I have received the analysis of Family Relationships between the Auditor and the Audit
Client. While I applaud the spirit of the effort to remove any appearance of impropriety,
the complicated world we live in may make the attempt difficult to achieve the desired
ends.
Specifically, I am referring to item (5.) on page (9) of the analysis. The term immediate
family and close relative are subject to broad interpretations. Also, it does not mention or
include “significant other, roommates, or close friends”, who may have better
relationships and communications than the actual family members. Additionally, there
was no mention of ex-family and friends through the divorce process. With family units
ill defined, focus may be placed in narrow areas, providing regulations with a false
security.

Edward J. Stavetski
Chief Investment Officer
EJS/ejr

Enclosures

MARGOLIN, WINER & EVENS LLP
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS & BUSINESS ADVISORS - ESTABLISHED 1946

400 GARDEN CITY PLAZA, GARDEN CITY, NY 1 1530-3317
(516) 747-2000 FAX: (516) 747-6707

September 24, 1999

Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Attention: ITC 99-1

Gentlemen:
We are pleased to offer our comments with respect to Invitation to Comment (ITC 99-1)
“Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client” dated July 1999.
Question 1
We agree with the Proposal’s basic distinction between audit firm personnel “on an
engagement’ and those who are uninvolved when determining how family relationships
affect auditor independence. In many situations appropriate safeguards can effectively
isolate uninvolved individuals with relationship issues from the client irrespective of their
geographic location or partnership status. We do not believe geographic proximity or
partnership status in and of themselves should be the determining factors. As an
example, partners with relationship issues in large practice offices may in fact be more
isolated from the client than managerial employees in small, but separate offices.

We do not agree that all employment by the client of an “immediate family member” of
individuals “on an engagement” should be prohibited. Current SEC and AICPA rules
do not proscribe certain employment of spouses and dependents. In the absence of
evidence that employment of an “immediate family member” in a capacity other than a
“key position” has resulted in impairment of independence, it does not make sense to
strengthen the restrictions that apply to this group even if the definition of “on an
engagement” results in a smaller group. Rather, we suggest that the ISB mandate that
all employment by the client of an “immediate family member” of individuals “on an
engagement" be disclosed to the Audit Committee.

Question 2
As indicated in our comments under Question 1, be believe no distinction should be
made based on geographic location, accordingly, we prefer alternative A. We agree
with the guidance in Alternative A concerning the immediate practice environment. If
the Board decides that Alternative B is preferable, we suggest serious consideration be
given to incorporating the guidance in Alternative A, which we believe can be equally
applicable to multi-office environments. The Board should also consider changing the
phrase “those likely to influence the audit”, which is part of the definition of “on an
engagement”, to “those with the potential to influence the audit”.

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, SEC PRACTICE SECTION AND PRIVATE COMPANIES PRACTICE SECTION

CPA ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, INC. WITH OFFICES IN PRINCIPAL U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL CITIES

MARGOLIN, WINER & EVENS

llp

CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS • ESTABLISHED 1946

Independence Standards Board
September 24, 1999
Page 2

Question 3
At this time, we believe it is appropriate to separate independence implications of family
employment relationships from financial interests resulting from such employment.
Current rules ascribe all financial interests of a spouse or other dependent to the
member and we believe those rules should remain in effect until the broader subject of
financial interests is reconsidered in its entirety. In that regard, we note that the
guidance concerning financial interests of partners or staff not on the engagement in
paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Proposal appear contradictory. Specifically, paragraph 6
gives the following example of family investments with respect to partners or staff not
on the engagement that cause the firm’s independence to be impaired:

•

“With respect to individuals not on the engagement, a firm will not be considered
independent if a member of the immediate family of any firm partner, or of a
managerial employee in an office participating in a significant portion of the audit,
has any investment with a client, or with someone in a key position at the client.”

Paragraph 7 provides the following example of relationships that may be resolved with
adequate mitigating controls:
•

For firm partners and staff not on the engagement:
- An immediate family member has a materia, investment with the client or with
someone in a key position at the client.

Inasmuch as the guidance in paragraph 6 seems appropriate and is consistent with
existing rules regarding financial interests, we suggest the last bullet in paragraph 7 be
removed.

Question 4
Although the inclusion of brothers and sisters of the member’s spouse within the
definition of “close relative” is more restrictive then the AICPA’s definition, it is
consistent with the SEC’s current policy and we have no objection. Accordingly, we
agree with the definition of “close relative” in the Appendix.
Question 5
We believe the definition of “key position” is appropriate.
Question 6
The second paragraph of our response to Question 1 addresses this question and is
repeated below.
We do not agree that all employment by the client of an “immediate family member” of
individuals “on an engagement’ should be prohibited. Current SEC and AICPA rules
do not proscribe certain employment of spouses and dependents. In the absence of
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evidence that employment of an “immediate family member” in a capacity other than a
“key position” has resulted in impairment of independence, it does not make sense to
strengthen the restrictions that apply to this group even if the definition of “on an
engagement” results in a smaller group. Rather, we suggest that the ISB mandate that
all employment by the client of an “immediate family member” of individuals “on an
engagement” be disclosed to the Audit Committee.
Question 7
We believe the guidance in paragraph 7 of the Proposal is appropriate with the
exception of the last bullet, which we believe should be removed since it conflicts with
paragraph 6 and conflicts with current rules regarding financial interests. The following
is abstracted from our response to Question 3 which more completely addresses our
concern.
The guidance concerning financial interests of partners or staff not on the engagement
in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Proposal appear contradictory. Specifically, paragraph 6
gives the following example of family investments with respect to partners or staff not
on the engagement that cause the firm’s independence to be impaired:

•

“With respect to individuals not on the engagement, a firm will not be considered
independent if a member of the immediate family of any firm partner, or of a
managerial employee in an office participating in a significant portion of the audit,
has any investment with a client, or with someone in a key position at the client.”

Paragraph 7 provides the following example of relationships that may be resolved with
adequate mitigating controls:
•

For firm partners and staff not on the engagement:
- An immediate family member has a materia, investment with the client or with
someone in a key position at the client.

Inasmuch as the guidance in paragraph 6 seems appropriate and is consistent with
existing rules regarding financial interests, we suggest the last bullet in paragraph 7 be
removed.

Question 8A
This safeguard should not be permitted to overcome an otherwise required prohibition.
Question 9
We believe that the effects of death of, or divorce by, a relative should be addressed
inasmuch as the definition of “close relative” encompasses the respective spouses of
most relatives. We agree that death or divorce reduce, but may not eliminate, the
existing family relationship with the remaining individuals, and that judgment must be
applied after careful analysis of relevant facts and circumstances.
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Question 10
No comment

Question 11
No comment.
Other Matters
Under the caption “AICPA Rules Applicable to All Auditors”, DM 99-3 states that “In
performing appraisals, all auditors must comply with the independence requirements of
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) (auditors of public
companies must also comply with SEC rules where these are more restrictive).” If the
ISB adopted the Proposal set forth in the Invitation to Comment, the auditor of a public
entity could be in compliance with the independence requirements of the ISB but in
violation of the requirements of the AICPA unless the AICPA changes its independence
rules, since the rules of the AICPA would be more stringent than the rules of the ISB in
certain specific circumstances.
We question whether the terms co-habitant and dependent should be defined. By co
habitant is the Proposal referring to individuals living together when not legally married,
or is the Proposal referring to all instances of individuals living together (including
roommates, nondependent children living with their parents, etc.). We believe that only
co-habitants with a relationship akin to that of a spouse should be considered an
“immediate family member”, accordingly, we do not believe roommates or
nondependent children living with parents should be considered “immediate family
members”. Further, is our understanding that the AICPA Professional Ethics Division
considers IRS definitions in determining whether an individual is a dependent.
We would be happy to discuss the above comments at your convenience.

Very truly yours,

Michael R. Peress
Partner
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Questions for comment

1. We believe the SEC definition makes more sense in terms of identifying true conflicts
of interest. It looks for family members in key positions in the client company (those
that could influence the financial statements). Someone’s son working in the mail
room, for example, is not likely to compromise independence. It also applies the
definition to any partner of the audit firm or any employee of the audit firm providing
services to the client company (say, consulting services). Extending the family
relationship rule to consultants helps to preserve the “Chinese wall” between the
provision of auditing and consulting services to the same client. The ISB proposal,
on the other hand, only applies to persons actually involved in the audit but their
family members cannot be employed in any capacity by the client, even in a low
ranking position. Instead of such an absolutist solution, we believe the critical factor
is adequate disclosure by the audit firm. Based on this, the client company board,
which hires the audit firm, should ultimately decide whether a conflict of interests
truly exists.
2. Alternative B offers greater protection since partners and managerial employees in
the office conducting the audit could have an indirect influence on it. However, there
are too many nuances of how “office” could be defined, depending on how the
particular audit firm is structured. We defer to our response in Item 1, which
advocates disclosure of family relationships to the client company to determine if
there are conflicts of interest.

3. Financial interests relating to employment could be treated in conjunction with other
financial interests as long as they don’t play into the definition of what constitutes a
“key position” with the client.
4. An aunt, uncle or cousin could also constitute a close relative. Because the strength
of individual relationships may vary from family to family, no definition can be allencompassing.

5. OK
6. See Item 1.

7. See Item 1.

8. A separate auditor for the subsidiary could be included as a possible control measure.
9. No

10. No
11. We are not aware of specific research on this.
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that our position is based on our conclusions regarding the definitions of "close relative"
and "key position", as discussed below.
2.B.

We do not support Alternative B. However, if an approach is adopted based on the
office in which a person is located, the definition of "an office" should incorporate a
number of factors, rather than relying on one factor, such as physical location. In
today's environment, physical location has less relevance as employees are often
assigned to locations that differ from where they reside and the number of employees
telecommuting continues to rise. Some of the factors to consider include geographic
location, the firm's organizational structure, the community served by the locations and
the appearance to the public.
The definition should not be based on whether the office is managed on a "service-line"
or "industry" rather than a "geographic" basis. Firms are structured and managed in
many different ways. Consequently, a definition so based will result in inconsistency in
the application of the rule.

2. C.

3.

As noted in paragraphs 3 and 4, firms should adopt policies and procedures on the
independence implications of family relationships. These policies and procedures
should address situations, such as small offices, where there may be a greater likelihood
that the family relationship of another partner or manager in the office may appear to
create an independence issue. The policies and procedures might include additional
reviews; however, the standard should allow a firm the flexibility to adopt those quality
control policies it deems appropriate in the circumstances.

We are supportive of the need to revise the rules applicable to family relationships
between the auditor and the audit client. Changes in the work environment, as noted in
the ITC, are such that the existing rules need to be revised if the accounting profession is
going to continue to attract and retain the best people. However, many of the family
relationships that would not present a problem under this proposal will continue to
impair the auditor's independence because of the financial interests rules.
Consequently, we believe that any revision to the family relationship rules should
include the ancillary issues involving compensation arrangements and retirement plans
offered by many employers today. We suggest such changes permit family members
employed by audit clients to receive equity-based compensation provided the
compensation is offered to similarly situated employees and the family member
disposes of the financial interest when there are no longer significant penalties
associated with the disposition.
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4.

We believe that the term "close relative" should include immediate family members and
other individuals whose relationship with the partner or staff member on the
engagement is such that there is a threat to independence. The group of "others"
proposed is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Tor example, the spouse of the
spouse's sibling is included. In some cases, the auditor may have no relationship with
this person. Even for closer relatives, the auditor's relationship may be such that there is
no threat to independence. Conversely, there may be cases where the auditor's
relationship with a non-relative may create an independence issue. For example, the
auditor may have a very close friendship with a person holding an important position
with the client.
We appreciate that "bright line" rules may be easier to apply. However, they also may
lead to arbitrary results that, in some cases, are ludicrous. An auditor may be deemed
not independent because of a sibling living hundreds of miles away with whom the
auditor has had little or no contact for years. Given changes in familial relationships in
and the mobility of our society, these types of situations are not uncommon.
Consequently, we suggest that the family relationships that by their nature impair
independence be limited to immediate family members. Other relatives, including those
identified in the proposed definition of close relative, and non-relatives should be
evaluated on a facts and circumstances basis, considering the threats to independence
and the possible safeguards to mitigate any concerns that relationships between such
individuals and those on the engagement would impair the auditor's independence.

5.

We suggest several revisions to the definition of "key position". First, officers should be
deleted. Some corporations name as officers many individuals who neither hold
sensitive financial positions nor can significantly influence financial or operating
matters. More importantly, the inclusion of certain designated employees and others
should adequately cover those officers who would be deemed to hold key positions.
These are the individuals who would potentially threaten the auditor's independence.
Second, we would replace the reference to "in a sensitive financial position" because it
introduces a new and unnecessary term of art. The SEC's rules refer to persons who
"appear to have the opportunity to mold the shape of the financial statements." AICPA
Interpretation 101-9 refers to persons who can exercise significant influence over the
entity's "primary operating, financial, or accounting policies". These concepts
encompass the group of individuals who, if close to the auditor, would pose a threat to
independence.
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If revised as recommended (and reflecting certain editorial changes), the definition of
"key position" would be:
A key position held by an individual with respect to the client includes: director,
underwriter, promoter, voting trustee, or employee, but only if the employee
appears to have the opportunity to mold the shape of the financial statements or
can exercise significant influence over the client's primary operating, financial or
accounting policies. Other individuals may be deemed to hold a key position
because their role and responsibilities are comparable to those of employees
holding key positions.

6.

In our view, the proposal to prohibit any employment by the client of the immediate
family members of those on the engagement goes well beyond what is necessary to
ensure the auditor's independence. The ITC identified four threats to auditor
independence. None of these threats would exist if the family member were employed
in a position that had no direct or indirect contact with the audit engagement team or
association with the financial statements. For example, a spouse could be employed in a
non-managerial sales position or a dependent child could take a summer job as a sales
clerk. Positions such as these would not threaten the auditor's independence.
Prohibitions against employing immediate family members would place significant
burdens on many within the firms. This is particularly true for those two-income
families living in smaller cities, where the employment opportunities may be
significantly more limited than those in larger cities. An unnecessary hardship is
created by the proposal. Given this hardship, accounting firms will become a much less
attractive employer and public accounting a less attractive career choice.

Immediate family members and close relatives (as defined above) of partners and staff
on the audit engagement or involved in the audit (including, for example, the tax
partner who participates in the accrual review) should be prohibited from holding key
positions (as defined above) with the client. In addition, if positions are held by
immediate family members and close relatives that do no constitute key positions, the
positions should nevertheless be reviewed under the firm's policies and procedures and
appropriate safeguards should be put in place, if necessary, to assure that any risks to
independence are mitigated.
As noted in our response to Question 2.A., immediate family members and close
relatives (as defined above) of partners and managerial employees on non-attest
engagements should generally be prohibited from holding key positions (as defined
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above). In cases where these partners and managers are assigned to the client and
provide ongoing and in some instances recurring services, we believe it is appropriate to
prohibit the close relatives of such partners and managers from holding key positions
with the client. However, a partner and manager may work on a short-term project for a
client and render few if any other services for the client during the course of a year. In
the latter case, we do not believe the prohibition against employment of close relatives
should apply to such partner and manager. This type of situation should be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis to assess the threat to the auditor's independence of the family
relationship. We do not believe it is necessary to extend this rule to staff below the
manager level.

7.

As drafted, paragraph 7 implies that the relationships included therein impair the
auditor's independence unless adequate controls are employed. We do not believe it is
appropriate to expand presumptively the scope of relationships that impair
independence. The examples may be helpful in identifying the types of relationships
that could raise independence concerns. However, the presumption should be deleted.
As discussed above with respect to the definition of close relative, we believe all close
relationships between members of the engagement team and persons in key positions
should be reviewed to determine if the relationship threatens the auditor's
independence. Blood ties, no matter how distant or indirect, should not be what drives
the evaluation.

8. A.

We believe the audit of a material or immaterial subsidiary by another firm should
generally cure an independence problem that is created due to a family relationship that
exists at the subsidiary's level.
In some cases, the auditor is engaged to audit a subsidiary, but not the parent. If a
family relationship issue exists at the parent level, we do not believe that the auditor's
independence is per se impaired. The auditor should assess whether the close relative
would be deemed to hold a key position with respect to the subsidiary, i.e., whether the
relative appears to have the opportunity to mold the shape of the financial statements or
can exercise significant influence over the subsidiary's primary operating, financial or
accounting policies.

8.B.

When a family relationship poses a threat to the auditor's independence, the safeguards
and mitigating factors identified in paragraph 15 of the ITC may be helpful in resolving
the independence issue. We believe it is important to analyze the particular facts of each

case and determine what safeguards are appropriate under the circumstances.
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9.

The proposal should be expanded to cover the effects of the divorce by or death of a
relative since it is not uncommon for independence issues to arise as a result of these
events. The guidance should provide that these situations be dealt with on a case-bycase basis after considering the threats to independence and possible safeguards and
mitigating factors. Examples should be included of the types of factors the auditor
should consider in evaluating the impact of a divorce or death on independence. Some
of the questions an auditor might ask include:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Who got divorced or died and when did the event occur?
How close was the auditor to the divorced relative?
If the auditor's spouse died, how close was the auditor to his or her spouse's family?
Where do the parties live?
How often do the relatives socialize?
Would the public perceive the relationship to be close, despite a death or divorce?

10.

We do not believe there are other broad family relationship models or other key criteria
for evaluating relationships the Board should consider.

11.

We are not aware of research in this area.

We also offer the following comments on issues not specifically raised in the questions set forth
in the ITC:
•

The first bullet point in paragraph 5 of the proposal provides that immediate family
members of any partner or staff member on the engagement are prohibited from have any
investment with the client or with someone in a key position with the client. Similarly,
paragraph 6 of the proposal provides that any firm partner, or a managerial employee in an
office participating in a significant portion of the audit, is prohibited from having any
investment with a client or with someone in a key position at a client. We believe that these
prohibitions are more restrictive than necessary to protect the auditor's independence. We
recommend that in each case, the prohibition be limited to material direct investments.

•

The ITC notes that the proposal does not address the periods covered by the proposed rules.
We believe that the standard should have an effective date that does not penalize
individuals who made employment decisions based on current rules. Thus, for example, if
the new standards prohibit any employment of immediate family members, spouses and
dependents in positions permissible under existing standards would not be permitted to
continue under the new rules unless the rules contain a "grandfathering" provision. In the
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interests of fairness, employment situations that were permissible should continue to be so
under any newly adopted standard.

•

Paragraph 3 of the proposal provides that each firm has responsibility for its independence.
We fully concur that independence is the firm's responsibility and it is necessary for the firm
to establish appropriate policies, procedures and processes to provide reasonable assurance
that the auditor's independence is not impaired. The proposal also suggests that each firm
implement an identification and notification system. We believe it is more appropriate for
each firm to determine the means by which it will satisfy itself that partners and employees
are complying with its independence policies. Firms might, for example, require all
partners and employees to attend training sessions, require annual confirmations with
respect to compliance with independence policies, establish communication channels to
assure that independence issues get surfaced, and build into audit engagement acceptance
procedures questions regarding family relationships.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on ITC 99-1 and would be pleased to discuss our
comments with the Board or its staff. Please contact Charles A. Horstmann at (312) 507-3071 or
Jean L. Rothbarth at (312) 507-2827 with any questions.
Sincerely,
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Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attn: ITC 99-1

Gentlemen:

The AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) and SEC Practice
Section Executive Committee (SECPS) are pleased to submit this comment letter to the
Independence Standards Board with regard to ITC 99-1, Family Relationships Between
the Auditor and the Audit Client.
With regard to the specific questions outlined in the Invitation to Comment, we have the
following comments:
1. While we strongly support the “engagement team” approach, we do not agree with
the proposal that would prohibit all immediate family members from having any
employment with the client. For example, we fail to see the threat to independence
imposed by a son of a member of the engagement team who is employed by the client
on its assembly line. Clearly, such an individual could have no impact on the audited
financial statements or influence the engagement team.

2. A. We support the Alternative A definition of “those likely to influence the audit”
and do not believe the additional restrictions imposed by Alternative B are necessary.
B. Although we do not support Alternative B, we would like to recommend several
criteria that should be considered if the Board decides to define “an office”. In
determining whether an office is separate, one should consider physical location and
geographic area, community served, organizational structure of the firm, quality
control structure of the firm, and common staffing arrangements among offices.
C. Although we agree that in a small firm, there may be a perception that all partners
may be able to influence the audit, we believe adequate safeguards could be
implemented by the firm to protect its independence. For example, an additional
review by an outside firm, in the case where a partner of a small firm has performed
the audit, could ensure that the audit engagement was performed with objectivity. In
the case of a large firm, an additional review by a second partner would appear to
mitigate any threat to independence.

In addition, we believe that the proposed definition of “on an engagement” should be
limited to those individuals directly involved with the audit engagement, as well as
those likely to influence the audit. Individuals directly involved with the audit
engagement would include those individuals who provide support to the audit
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
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In addition, we question whether it is intended that the reference to an underwriter
include just those employees of an organization that are directly involved in the
provision of services to a client, or is it intended to include all employees of the
underwriter? We recommend the former.

We also believe that the term “key position” would be more appropriately defined if
the language were revised as follows, “...or with significant influence over primary
financial, accounting, or operating policies...”
6. As noted in no. 1 above, we are not in support of prohibiting all immediate family
members from having any employment with the client. Specifically, those family
members who are employed in positions that are neither audit sensitive nor allow for
significant influence pose no threat to the independence of the firm. Accordingly, we
recommend that this restriction not be included in any resulting standard

7. We agree with the guidance provided in paragraph 7 of the Proposal and believe it is
appropriate for the firm to resolve other family relationship issues using a threats and
safeguards approach on a case by case basis.
8. A. We believe that where certain prohibited family relationships are limited to a
subsidiary level, the threats to independence are adequately mitigated by having a
separate auditor audit the subsidiary. In addition, in the situation where the firm
audits a subsidiary and a prohibited family relationship exists at the parent level, we
believe independence would not be impaired provided a separate auditor audits the
parent company and the close relative, through their position at the parent, cannot
exercise significant influence over the subsidiary’s primary operating, financial or
accounting policies.
B. With regard to additional mitigating factors that should be considered, we offer
the following:

•

•
•
•
•

ISB Standard No. 1, Independence Discussions with Audit Committees
requires annual written and oral communications between the auditor and
the audit committee
Internal firm communications and inspection procedures
Peer review program
Quality Control Inquiry Committee (QCIC) and oversight by the POB
Concurring partner review

9. We believe that the types of events described in paragraph 16 of the ITC, such as the
death of, or divorce by, a relative are significant issues that should be addressed in the
Proposal. We recommend that in such situations, it would be appropriate for the firm
to consider the resulting family relationship and formally evaluate the situation using
a threats and safeguards approach.

3

10. We are not aware of any other factors the Board should consider for evaluating family
relationships.
11. We are not aware of any prior research performed on this issue.

In addition to our responses to the specific questions set forth in the Proposal, we have
the following comments:

•

We believe that the first bullet of paragraph 5 of the Proposal should be revised to
prohibit only “material closely-held” investments with the client or someone in a key
position with the client and that the last sub-bullet of paragraph 7 should be similarly
revised.

•

We recommend that the proposed standard include a transitional provision in order to
mitigate the negative impact on family members who made career decisions based on
the rules that were in effect at the time. In other words, if the family relationship is
permissible under the existing rules, it should be grandfathered under any new
standard.

We appreciate this opportunity to comment. We would be pleased to discuss in further
detail these comments and any other matters with respect to the Board’s Discussion
Memorandum.
Sincerely,

James L. Curry
Chair
PEEC

Michael A. Conway
Chair
SECPS
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October 6, 1999

Mr. William T. Allen, Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas
6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re:

Invitation to Comment: Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit
Client

Dear Mr. Allen:

One of the objectives that the Council of the American Institute of CPAs established for the PCPS
Executive Committee is to act as an advocate for all local and regional firms and represent those
firms' interests on professional issues, primarily through the Technical Issues Committee ("TIC").
This communication is in accordance with that objective.
TIC has reviewed the above referenced Invitation to Comment (“ITC”) and is providing the
following comments and suggestions for your consideration.

PARTNERS AND STAFF “NOT ON AN ENGAGEMENT”
TIC members note that with respect to partners and staff “not on an engagement,” page 9 of the ITC
provides that “a firm will not be considered independent if a member of the immediate family of
any firm partner, or of a managerial employee in an office participating in a significant portion of
the audit, has any investment with a client, or with someone in a key position at a client.”
TIC members believe that the appearance of independence cannot be maintained and that a firm’s
independence is therefore impaired if any firm partner that is “not on an engagement” has an
immediate family member or close relative that is employed by the client.

“THOSE LIKELY TO INFLUENCE THE A UDIT”
The definition of the term “on an engagement” on page 11 of the ITC includes two alternatives for
defining the phrase “those likely to influence the audit.” Both of those alternatives indicate that
“those likely to influence the audit” include individuals “who supervise or perform technical
consultation, quality control or other oversight of the partners and staff members involved in the
audit.”

To ensure the proper application of the term “on an engagement,” TIC members suggest that the
final description of “those likely to influence the audit” include firm managing partners and regional
managing partners as examples.
1

We appreciate the opportunity to present these comments on behalf of PCPS member firms. We
would be pleased to discuss our comments with you at your convenience.
Sincerely,

James A. Koepke, Chair
PCPS Technical Issues Committee

JAK:lec

cc: PCPS Executive and Technical Issues Committees
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October 6, 1 999

TO THE INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BOARD

The Ethics Committee of the International Federation of Accountants appreciates the
opportunity of commenting on the Exposure Draft analyzing issues related to Family
Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client. The Committee commends the Board
and its staff for its thoughtful consideration of this issue. Our comments follow.
1. The definition of "on an engagement" needs further clarification as to the way it applies to
those "likely" to influence the audit. Alternative B could be unduly restrictive because it
would apply to persons who may not provide any services to the client; i.e., a partner who
is a firm consultant on a particular industry would be subject to the rule even though that
partner did not in fact provide consultation related to specific client. Alternative A needs
additional clarification regarding how a firm can maintain its independence if a consulting or
quality control partner who, in fact, is not on an engagement has such a relationship.
"Informal" influence is too vague a description to be useful in applying such a principle.
Paragraph 4 recommends isolation as a control or safeguard to eliminate family relationship
independence risks. Assuming an adequate isolation control as described is adopted by a
firm, that would appear to satisfy the requirement in Alternative A.

Consideration should also be given to this factor in Paragraph 6. Could the isolated
partner's immediate family or close relative retain a financial interest with the audit client, if
in practice, isolation would remove the risk of appearance of a lack of independence?
2.

"Key position" and "significance influence" should be more completely defined; definition is
also needed for the phrase "other individuals with comparable responsibilities".

3. Of particular concern to IFAC as a representative of international professionals, is the
definition of "immediate family member" which includes "co-habitant". In many countries
family relationships have different patterns than the traditional U.S. "nuclear family".
Households in many countries include numerous extended family relationships and can
include many who would fall outside of even the "close relative" definition of this proposal.
Even in the U.S. the term co-habitant could include those sharing a household with no
financial or emotional ties, which appears to be more restrictive than warranted to protect
the public interest. We believe therefore that a definition of "co-habitant" or a modification
to specify that only dependent co-habitants would be considered to be immediate family
members would be preferable.
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4. A minor point regarding Paragraph 4 is that many of our members were not familiar with
the term "recusal" so that for international users of the guidelines, it would be helpful to
also define this term within the document.
Thank you for considering our comments.
Sincerely,

IFAC Ethics Committee
Marilyn A. Pendergast, Chair
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VIA E-MAIL AND FED EX

William T. Allen, Chairman
Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re: ITC 99-1 Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client

Dear Mr. Allen:

The Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR)1 is pleased to
comment on the Independence Standards Board’s proposal regarding Family Relationships
Between the Auditor and the Audit Client. AIMR’s Advocacy Advisory Committee2 (AIMR
Committee) provides its comments below.

Background
The mission of the Independence Standards Board (ISB) is to establish independence
standards applicable to the audits of public entities in order to serve the public interest and to
protect and promote investors’ confidence in the securities markets. To further its goals of
improving independence requirements, the ISB is considering revising those requirements
relating to family relationships. The primary purpose of these revisions is to develop principlesbased standards to better address the threats to auditor independence raised by family
relationship. The proposal focuses on circumstances where the ISB believes the risk is highest—
for those on the engagement team and others who are likely to be able to influence the
engagement. The ISB believes that threats to independence exist in situations involving family
relationships where a reasonable investor, in possession of the relevant facts, would be
concerned about the integrity and objectivity with which the audit was conducted, and therefore
about the credibility of the underlying financial statements.

1 The Association for Investment Management and Research is a global, nonprofit organization of over 39,000
investment professionals from 91 countries. Through its headquarters in the U.S., and 89 Member Societies and
Member Chapters throughout the world, AIMR provides global leadership in investment education, professional
standards, and advocacy programs.

2 The Advocacy Advisory Committee coordinates the priorities of AIMR’s Advocacy committees and reviews major
new regulatory, legislative, and other developments affecting AIMR’s global membership.
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AIMR Position

A. AIMR Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct
AIMR strongly supports the fair treatment of the investing public and encourages high
ethical and professional standards in the financial services industry. AIMR believes that an
ethical and proficient industry is in the best interests of the investors who rely on professional
financial services. Moreover, maintenance of such an industry is also in the best interests of
financial service professionals who seek to compete fairly on the basis of their activities.
Toward this end, AIMR requires its members, holders of the Chartered Financial Analyst
(CFA®) designation, and CFA candidates to abide by the AIMR Code of Ethics and Standards
of Professional Conduct (Code and Standards). The AIMR Committee is pleased that the
proposed ISB standard promotes similar protections that ultimately work to enhance the
efficiency and strength of the market. If adopted, the proposed standard will strengthen investor
confidence in the investment industry by requiring auditors to honor a high standard of conduct
in their dealings with the investing public.
AIMR promotes its goals of fostering and maintaining the integrity of the financial
services industry and protecting the investing public by enumerating several fundamental ethical
principles within its Code and Standards. The ISB seeks to promote the same fundamental
ethical principles through its Family Relationships proposal. Both approaches are grounded in
the principles of integrity, disclosure, conflicts of interest, and responsibility to the employer and
the client.

B. Disclosing Conflicts of Interest

The ISB proposal deals with a particular type of conflict of interest—family relationships
between auditors and audit clients. Such a conflict of interest can have a negative impact on an
auditor’s independence, objectivity, and integrity in preparing credible financial statements. The
ISB proposal addresses this issue by defining the existence of a family relationship that
potentially gives rise to a conflict of interest and specifically recommends that audit firms
disclose relevant family relationships and the possible implications to appropriate client
management and the audit committee.

The AIMR Code and Standards recognize the possible deleterious effect of such conflicts
of interest. Consequently, a fundamental principle of the AIMR Code and Standards is the
disclosure of conflicts of interest that could potentially impair an AIMR member’s ability to
make unbiased and objective recommendations. Standard IV(B.7) specifically requires AIMR
members to disclose such actual and potential conflicts to clients. Furthermore, Standard
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IV(A.3) requires AIMR members to use reasonable care and judgment to maintain independence
and objectivity in making recommendations that are unaffected by potential conflicts of interest
or by circumstances that may adversely affect their judgment. The AIMR standards require all
disclosures to be made in plain language and in a manner designed to effectively communicate
the information to clients. Such disclosures should be made before any action is taken.
Members must also take care to avoid even the appearance of a loss of independence and
objectivity.

Applying these principles of disclosure of conflicts of interest and maintaining
independence and objectivity to auditors helps to ensure that users of an enterprise’s financial
statements can have confidence that the audited financial statements and disclosures fairly
represent the financial position, results of operations, and other key financial data of the audited
enterprise. A formal disclosure procedure also ensures that there is written documentation of a
family relationship and that these relationships are communicated to the enterprise’s Board of
Directors and audit committee.

C. Compliance Program

The ISB recommends that the ultimate responsibility for maintaining auditor
independence be placed on the audit firm itself. This would entail establishing a compliance
program that would include written policies and procedures, education courses, and other
appropriate forms of communication. The ISG also recommends that each audit firm implement
certain safeguards and mitigating controls.

A goal of the Family Relationship standard is to assist audit firms in conducting their
business in an ethical manner that promotes fairness and integrity. The AIMR Committee
believes that conducting an ethical and compliant business in the investment industry requires
ethical employee behavior. The AIMR Committee strongly supports, therefore, the
recommendation that firms adopt a compliance program because an effective and visible
compliance program serves as the cornerstone of an ethical business. It creates a common
understanding of the organization’s values and serves as a reference for individuals seeking guidance on what is expected business conduct. Furthermore, the AIMR Committee supports the
proposed safeguards and mitigating controls as further protections that help to ensure the fairness
and integrity of financial statements and related disclosures on which users of that information
depend.
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D. Defining the Engagement

The ISB proposes to define whether audit personnel are “on the engagement” to mean
any partner or staff member who is directly involved with providing any professional services to
the client, as well as those likely to influence the audit. Two alternatives are proposed to define
those likely to influence the audit:
Alternative A: those who supervise or provide technical consultation, quality control, or other
oversight of the partners and staff members involved in the audit.

Alternative B: those partners and managerial employees that perform a significant portion of the
audit work, and also those persons who supervise or perform a technical consultation, quality
control, or other oversight of the partners and staff members involved in the audit.
The AIMR Committee supports Alternative B for determining which audit firm staff
should be considered on an engagement for purposes of applying the family relationship
standard. However, the AIMR Committee believes that the language of this alternative should
be made less ambiguous. This alternative includes supervisors and technical consultants, as
required by alternative A. However, alternative B is comprehensive enough to include those
individuals who are directly involved in valuing client assets and liabilities, assessing what
values and data are reflected in the financial statements, and ultimately determining audit
conclusions. The AIMR Committee believes that it is important to include these individuals as
they can influence the information that is provided in an enterprise’s financial statements and
related disclosures.

The AIMR Committee believes, however, that applying the family relationship standard
to certain partners and managerial staff based on whether they perform a “significant portion” of
the audit work is ambiguous. The AIMR Committee recommends a definition that is based
instead on whether the task or function performed by the individual could affect the integrity of
the audit. Such a materiality criterion helps to ensure objectivity. The AIMR Committee further
believes that this alternative should be adopted without regard for the size of an audit firm. -
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Conclusion

The AIMR Committee appreciates the opportunity to comment on this proposal.
Questions about the AIMR Committee’s position may be directed to Philippa Hughes at
804.951.5332 orpbh@aimr.org.
Sincerely,

/s/ Deborah A. Lamb

/s/ Philippa P.B. Hughes, Esq.

Deborah A. Lamb
Chair
AIMR Advocacy Advisory Committee

Philippa P.B. Hughes, Esq.
Associate
AIMR Office of the General Counsel
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Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, Sixth Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775

ITC 99-1—Comment Letter
Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client
We are pleased to submit this comment letter to the Independence Standards Board with regard
to ITC 99-1, Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client, and arc supportive
of the Board’s attempt to develop principles-based standards to better address the threats to
auditor independence raised by family relationships. The profession is in need of a more focused,
realistic approach given the large number of working spouses in today’s workplace and their
participation in broad-based, compensatory employee incentive programs.
If it is to be effective, we think the project must address employment-related financial interests.
In those situations where the professional’s immediate family member is employed by a client
(or employed by a nonclient whose benefit plan invests in clients) and the professional does not
participate in the audit engagement and is not able to influence the audit, the immediate family
member’s participation in broad-based employee incentive programs (e.g., stock option plans,
employee stock purchase plans, and 401(k) benefit plans—where participation is offered or
required in the ordinary course of business, usually as a part of a compensation program) should
be permitted, without regard to materiality (that is, there should be no mechanical materiality
test).

If this issue is not addressed, we wonder whether the Board’s effort is worthwhile. For example,
under current rules, the spouse of a partner located in office X may not have a job as a
consolidations manager with client Y, which is wholly serviced by office Z. Under the Proposal,
the partner’s spouse may have such a job (provided the partner is not in a position to influence
the audit); however, if participation in a stock compensation program is a reasonable and
customary aspect of the job, the partner’s spouse is in the same position as under the old rules.

Accordingly, we are not in agreement with paragraph no. 6 of the Proposal as it relates to broadbased employee incentive programs with respect to individuals not on the engagement (as
defined). However, if the Board determines that it will not address financial interests in
connection with the family relationship Proposal, paragraph no. 6 should be clarified to address
indirect financial interests as the current rules and practice permit immaterial indirect financial
interests held by one’s spouse as a result of employment (e.g.. stock options).
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In addition, we have the following major comments about the scope ofthe Proposal.

It has been our firm’s policy that professionals whose immediate family members are employed
by a client should not participate in the audit engagement for that entity and we are supportive of
this aspect of the Proposal. While we believe that there is little threat to independence when an
immediate family member’s employment is clearly not in a key position, we believe it is a good
policy and a practical cut. However, the Board’s Proposal would significantly expand the number
of professionals covered by this policy.
The threats outlined in paragraph no. 1 of the Proposal and paragraph no. 11 of the Discussion
appropriately deal with the “audit” and the “auditor” and as such we believe that the Proposal
should be directed to those professionals participating on the audit engagement (providing attest
sendees), as well as those in a position to influence the audit. The proposed rules should exclude
those professionals providing other professional services to the client (for example, consulting
services or other non-audit services). We believe that application of the rules to professionals
who provide other professional services to the entity that are not audit-related arc unnecessary
and would require extensive monitoring procedures that would not be cost beneficial.
With respect to those in a position to influence the audit, we strongly support Alternative A—
those who supervise or provide technical consultation, quality control or other oversight of the
partners and staff members involved in the audit (chain of command approach). However, in this
situation, we favor an approach that considers the employment position/job description of the
family member. We do not agree with the Proposal that would prohibit all immediate family
members from having any employment with the client. We believe that if the family member of
those in a position to influence the audit is not employed in a key position (such as a nurse at a
hospital audit client), there is no automatic impairment ofthe appearance of independence.

The distinction that we draw between the two approaches is that we can consciously not assign a
professional to an engagement when that person has an immediate family member employed by
the client. With respect to those in a position to influence the audit, their position cannot easily
be re-assigned. Therefore, we believe the Proposal should be amended to allow for such
situations to be resolved with adequate mitigating controls.
Paragraph nos. 5 through 7 of the Proposal refer in various ways to relatives having any
investment or any material investment with the client or someone in a key position with the
client. We believe that this is unclear and that the intent is to capture the existing rules dealing
with joint closely held business investments. Thus, the Proposal should refer to “joint”
investments. Further, we note that paragraph nos. 6 and 7 appear to be inconsistent. The second
sentence of paragraph no. 6 refers to partners and managerial employees in an office participating
in a significant portion of the audit (but not on the engagement) creating an independence
problem if a member of the immediate family has any investment (presumably joint) with a
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client. The last part of paragraph no. 7 says that for partners and staff not on the engagement that
there is a presumption of a need for formal evaluation if an immediate family member has a
material investment with a client. This inconsistency should be fixed, but in any case, we believe
that only material joint investments should be a problem.
Further Discussion Related to Questions for which Comments are Requested
1. The Proposal makes a basic distinction between audit firm personnel "on an engagement"
(broadly defined), and those who are uninvolved, when determining how family relationships
affect auditor independence. Current SEC rules instead distinguish between “members"
(defined as all partners, all managerial employees in offices performing a significant portion
of the audit, and all individuals providing professional services to a client) and non-members
in judging auditor independence. While the Proposal would limit the most stringent
restrictions to those “on the engagement”—generally a smaller group than those considered
"members”—it would strengthen the restrictions that apply to this group (by prohibiting any
employment by the client, as discussed further in Question 6A), as these individuals arc in
the best position to influence the outcome of the audit. Do you believe these changes are
warranted?
A change in the application of the rules from “member” to those professionals “on the
engagement’’ addresses the threats and concerns of stakeholders, as these are the
individuals who arc in a position to influence the audit. In that connection, the definition
of “on an engagement” in the glossary should be revised to make it operable by focusing
on those that are “in a position to influence the audit,” not “likely to influence the audit.”

2. A. The definition in the Appendix of “on an engagement” includes those who are “likely to
influence the audit” and is very important in applying the rule, and therefore merits
significant consideration. Alternative B, while less inclusive than the existing rules, includes
in its scope many partners and managerial employees of the work office not envisioned in
Alternative A. For example. Alternative B would prohibit a partner whose spouse is CFO of
an audit client being in an office performing a significant portion of that client’s audit
engagement, whereas Alternative A would instead require the firm to assess the likelihood of
the partner who is the CFO’s spouse influencing the audit and, if that did not result in
prohibition, then to rely on the consultation, recusal, disclosure and other controls described
in paragraph 4 of the Proposal. Do you believe that the added protection of independence
provided by Alternative B’s covering this group is sufficient to warrant that extension, and if
so, why?

B. If you support Alternative B, how would “an office” be defined, considering that a firm
might have several locations in or around a large city? Does it matter if the “office” is
managed on a “service-line” or an “industry” rather than a “geographic” basis?
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C. If you instead prefer Alternative A. it suggests that all partners in a small office or practice
unit might be considered as being, likely to influence the audit. Do you believe that approach
provides appropriate guidance? Would it be effective instead to isolate_partners or to require
additional reviews in these circumstances, or must audits of the companies with the family
relationships just be avoided?
As noted above, we support Alternative A (as amended for our comments) and do not
believe that the Proposal should be extended to automatically include employment of
immediate family members or close relatives of other partners or managerial employees
located in an office that performs a significant portion of tire audit work when those
individuals are by definition not involved in the audit or in a position to influence the
audit.

Alternative A describes situations to which the firm must be sensitive. However, in
applying the proposed rules in a small office situation where a partner not on tire
engagement has a family member employed in a key position at an audit client, such
controls as isolation of the partner, an independent review partner from outside the office,
additional reviews, discussion with the audit committee, could be effective controls.
There should not be a presumption that independence is impaired; the firm would need to
consider the specific facts and circumstances. In some cases, the firm may determine that
the facts and circumstances suggest that the engagement should be declined.
3. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the ITC describe the inter-relationship of a relative’s employment by a
client and the financial interests that flow from that employment. The Board, however, has
tentatively chosen to defer consideration of job-related financial interests of relatives until the
broader subject of financial interests can be reconsidered in its entirety. The basis for this
tentative decision is that the question of permissible financial interests in a client is a major
subject in its own right and has aspects broader than those of this project. Further, it is likely
that resolution of that topic could benefit from the conclusions of the Board’s in-process
Conceptual Framework project.

The Board therefore asks whether a resolution of the employment issues raised in this
Invitation to Comment, without dealing with the explicit financial interests that may come
with that employment, will provide useful guidance. Alternatively, you may want to
encourage the Board to expand the project, recognizing that doing so could delay issuance of
any standard - and, of course, with no commitment as to how the Board would decide on
such issues. Are the issues sufficiently different that the Board should now take up
employment-related financial interests separately from other financial interests? Please
describe the reasons for your conclusions.
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As indicated above, we believe the board should address employment-related financial
interests in conjunction with the project dealing with Family Relationships Between the
Auditor and the Audit Client.

4. “Close relative” is defined in the Appendix. Is that definition comprehensive enough, or too
comprehensive?
The proposed definition of close relative includes the “ . . . spouse’s parent, child, or
sibling and their respective spouses. . . .” We believe that the inclusion of the spouse’s
sibling’s spouse is overly restrictive and would recommend that such a relationship be
evaluated by the firm using a threats and safeguards approach.

5. Do you believe the definition of the term “key position” (with a client) is appropriate? If not,
what would you change?
The concept of “key position” as defined is generally appropriate. However, the reference
to underwriter, promoter, and voting trustee should be clarified to indicate that this is
only intended to cover situations where the relative is directly acting in such roles, and
does not include situations where the relative is employed (say as a systems programmer)
by a company that provides such services to a client, and the relative is in no way
involved with that activity.
Further, “key position” as it relates to officers and employees of a client should be limited
to those officers and employees that have the ability to exercise significant influence over
the operating, financial, or accounting policies of the client. Employees in lesser positions
do not pose sufficient threats to necessitate the proposed restrictions.

6. Under the Proposal’s paragraph 5, the immediate family of those on the engagement would
not be permitted to have any employment by the client. Under existing rules, employment of
an immediate family member is permitted unless the position is either audit sensitive or
capable of molding the financial statements. Would it be appropriate to prohibit nonsensitive
jobs based upon a premise that if the job is not appropriate for the auditor, then it also should
not be appropriate for the spouse? While all those who provide any professional service to
the client are defined to be “on the engagement,” some would suggest that it would be
adequate for this extra prohibition of any employment at the client to be limited to just those
who provide audit (attest) services. What are your views and why? (Note that the impact of
any conclusion could vary significantly depending on your view as to Question 2A.)
See earlier comments.
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7, Paragraph 7 of the Proposal provides guidance on when formal firm consultation might be
presumed for family relationship situations. Do you believe this guidance is appropriate, and
that the examples arc helpful instances of when such consulting should occur? Arc there
other examples you believe should be included?

Proposed guidance is appropriate.
8. A. Some believe that when certain family relationships exist at a client’s subsidiary level, a
significant safeguard can be provided by having a different accounting firm audit that
subsidiary. This potential safeguard has not been described in the Proposal. Should the
Proposal refer to this possible safeguard and, if so, how? For example, should that safeguard
just be among those to be considered in the firm’s overall evaluation of the family
relationship or, in certain fact patterns, should its use be permitted to overcome an otherwise
required prohibition? If the use of a separate auditor should overcome an otherwise
prohibition, under what criteria should that occur (e.g., only for immaterial subsidiaries, or
certain material ones as well)?

If there was a family relationship issue at a subsidiary level and that subsidiary was
audited by a different auditor, this should overcome any independence concerns.
However, assuming the ISB is responsive to our comments raised earlier with respect to
“on the engagement” defined as on the audit engagement or in a position to influence the
audit, we would not have a professional “on the engagement” in this situation. Given the
relative rarity of such situations, we do not believe it necessary to explicitly address this
issue.
B. Of how much help are the other safeguards, or “mitigating factors,” described in paragraph
15 of the ITC? Are there additional safeguards which you believe are important?
There is available a broad range of existing safeguards that may be appropriate given the
facts and circumstances of a particular situation. Our firm is a strong believer in a threats
and safeguards approach to handling independence issues. In this connection, we believe
the ISB should establish broad principles and require firms to implement appropriate
policies, procedures, and controls to demonstrate compliance. We do not believe it is
necessary or appropriate for the ISB to dictate these items and suggest that paragraph nos.
3 and 4 of the Proposal be revised accordingly. We note that this is consistent with the
conclusion of the AICPA SEC Practice Section Independence and Quality Controls Task
Force that has been dealing with the question of a membership requirement related to the
tracking/monitoring of member investments.

9. Paragraph 16 of the ITC discusses “the effects of death of, or divorce by, a relative,” although
these events are not currently mentioned in the Proposal. Should the Proposal be expanded to
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provide guidance in such situations? If so, what positions should that guidance take? If not,
why not?
The Proposal should not be expanded to provide guidance in situations involving death
and divorce. The judgment approach described in the ITC is reasonable. Such situations
should be reviewed by firm independence or other technical specialists on a facts and
circumstances basis. A similar judgment approach should be used in situations where the
family relationship is strained and virtually non-existent as documentation of a “non
relationship” and discussion with the audit committee should alleviate concents of the
potential impairment of the firm’s independence.

10. Are there other broad family relationship models, or other key criteria and factors for
evaluating relationships, which the Board should consider?
Subject to our comments above, we believe the approach discussed in the Invitation to
Comment is appropriate.

11. Is there research that the Board should be made aware of or should sponsor to assist it in
making informed judgments in these areas? If so, please offer recommendations.
We are not aware of any.

We would be pleased to discuss our comments with the Board or its staff.

Sincerely,
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FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES
INSTITUTE

October 15,1999
The Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10035-8775

Attention ITC 99-1
Gentlemen:

The Committee on Corporate Reporting ofthe Financial Executives Institute
represents the dual perspective of preparers whose financial statements are
audited by independent auditors, and executives who use and rely upon audited
financial statements. An independent audit is very important to us and to the
financial reporting environment.

We consider independence in fact to be of paramount importance in receiving a
quality audit. Independence in appearance is less a concern to us, except for the
important necessity that the audits we receive must be in full compliance with
applicable SEC and auditing profession requirements.
We believe it is appropriate to reexamine and most likely liberalize the family
relationship restrictions that are contained in the existing independence
requirements. The prevalence of two wage-earner families and the wide variety
of family and companion relationships that are present today largely
did not exist in the era when most of the independence rules were developed.

We also think the consolidation of the larger audit firms has added an important
dimension to this issue, in that it is more and more difficult to avoid
circumstances where there will be professional, even senior, persons working in
CPA firms who are married or otherwise related to persons in companies being
audited by the CPA firm.
In our view, a family or companion relationship should not exist between persons
who are direct participants in an audit engagement, and persons who are
employed by the company being audited. We think this should be true from the
top to the bottom ofthe chain of command, the top being the individual who signs
the audit opinion or gives final approval to the audit findings and audit
workpapers.
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We think persons who are directly employed in the chain of command of an audit
engagement and their next-of-kin family members and companions should not
own stock in the company being audited, nor should they be in control of stock of
that audited company held in another’s name, whether that other party is an
individual, a corporate entity, or an investment fund.

Starting from a blank slate, we believe investor needs and other public interest
concerns do not warrant extending these types of restrictions beyond the chain of
command that is directly involved in planning, conducting and signing off on the
audit. For example, we do not think that other persons in a local office of a CPA
firm or elsewhere in the larger CPA firm itself, who do not plan, conduct, review
or sign off on the audit, should be subject to any family relationship restrictions.
We think this should normally be true, even if these other individuals are involved
in providing non-audit professional services to the company being audited, but
with this caution: so long as the office is not so small, or the particular facts and
circumstances so concerning as to create a potential conflict of interest.

The essence of our view is a general principle that any person who is judged to
have some type of personal interest in a company should be excluded by the
CPA firm from any involvement in planning and conducting the audit of that
company. Once the need is satisfied to exclude from the audit any persons who
have some family or other personal interest in the audit client, we see no reason
to try to specify close and less-close relatives, companion relationships, and/or
gather in others who are employed by the same CPA firm, whether in the same
engagement office or elsewhere, but are not on the audit team, to be under
similar restrictions.

For example, we do not think it should matter what level or type of job a spouse
has, but should more directly be a matter of determining that, whenever there are
primary or secondary personal or business interests present that could
reasonably be ascribed to the member, and could reasonably be considered to
constitute a conflict of interest, that member should not be a part of the audit
team for that company’s engagement.
With the consolidation of CPA firms and the variety of family relationships in the
business marketplace, we believe that the focus for ensuring independence
should be on the professional individual in charge - the person who decides,
executes, or approves an audit - and the team of employees who actually
conduct the audit. Another way to describe this is the person who is licensed as
a certified public accountant and supervises the engagement and his or her
audit engagement staff. This person should be held responsible to ensure that
he or she is free from any conflict of interest, and that the audit is conducted in
an independent and competent fashion, free of any potential conflict of interest
among other members of the audit team.
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We have noticed that the quality of audits we receive is most directly a function of
the quality of the partner who is in charge of the audit, and this is where we think
the emphasis for ensuring independence belongs. Of course, we think it is
important and necessary that each CPA firm have internal control processes and
strong administrative procedures to support independence in fact in audits, and
an internal consulting organization to provide counsel and guidance in
questionable cases.

In regard to the numerous specific questions in the Invitation to Comment, our
general view would take us to a different set of questions, so we will not attempt
to address each item. It would follow, however, that in smaller modifications of
present practice, we would look mostly to “service lines" rather than an entire
local office, and to individuals who are involved directly in an audit, rather than to
other partners or managerial or other staff working elsewhere in the local office or
in the larger firm.
We also would not find it meaningful to attempt to make fine-grained distinctions
and subsets of rules between one type of blood relative and another, and
different in-law relatives, much less unmarried close companions. We would
focus instead on requirements, strong admonitions, strong controls, and stringent
penalties to ensure the fact of independence in an audit, requirements for
processes that identify and remove individuals who may have conflicts of
interests from the direct audit team.

Having penalties for an audit that is not independent in fact, penalties under law
and in the marketplace, can provide the sanctions and motivation to ensure
independence without the need for constant regulatory and professional rulings
on narrow issues and a detailed compendium of rules.
We are pleased to provide our comments and would be willing to answer
questions and participate in further discussions as needed.

Sincerely,

Susan Koski-Grafer
Vice President - Technical Activities
Financial Executives Institute
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Ernst &Young llp

200 Clarendon Street
Boston
Massachusetts 02116-5072

• Phone. 617 266 2000
Fax.
617 266 5843

September 27, 1999

Ms. Sheila M. Birch, CPA
Ciuni & Panichi, Inc.
25201 Chagrin Blvd. #200
Beachwood, OH 44122-5633

Dear Sheila:

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in NASBA’s process of responding to
the Independence Standards Board (ISB) invitation to comment. There are, as always,
difficulties with simple rules to complex transactions or situations in this document.
Some of our clients are very large and have many, many employees. For example, I
am by definition, a member of the engagement team of a retail store chain with over 800
locations. This rule would prohibit my college student child from accepting a job as a
part-time cashier at one of. their stores, or the wife of any partner in our office from
working in their advertising department. It seems to me that this is a bit extreme. Carved
to an extreme, based on this rule, when I was in our National Office, I would have been
on the. U.S. Postal Service engagement and my dependent child could not have been a
letter carrier. It is hard • to rationalize any of these as situations that endanger
independence of the firm conducting an audit.
I find the requirement to disclose "relevant family relationships” with the audit
committee to be overly simplistic without further guidance. If, for example, we conclude
that Ms. Smith, a junior accountant, cannot work on the audit of the XYZ Company
because her mother is a secretary in the office of the client, do we need to disclose this
decision to, and discuss this matter with, the Audit Committee? I hope not. Had we not
removed Ms. Smith from the engagement team, that decision would be relevant to the
Audit Committee. As the general propositions in ISB Standard No. 1 begin to mesh with
specific standards such as these, it will be important for the ISB to try to provide
additional discussion as to what is “relevant.”

My comments should not lead you to believe that I believe the ISB’s attention to
this questions is ill-advised or incorrect. I am pleased that the ISB recognizes that there
are differences based on family relationships and that some situations can be dealt with
by mitigating controls.
I have not seen NASBA’s responses to other documents submitted to me for
comment. I would appreciate learning how NASBA ultimately responds to this ISB
proposal.

Ernst & Young LLP is a

member of Ernst & Young International, Ltd.

Ernst& Young llp

Ms. Sheila M. Birch, CPA

September 27, 1999
Page Two

Thank you again for including me among the potential commentators on this
proposal.
Please feel free to contact me at (617) 859-6465 or by e-mail at
robert.temkin@ey.com if you would like to discuss any of this further.

Very truly yours,

Robert H. Temkin
Partner
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Ret: Family relationships between the auditor and the client;
Invitation to comment (ITC 99-1)

Mit freundlichen Grüßen
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Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas

New York

Düsseldorf, den 29.10.99
333/408/335
Dear Sir or Madam,
Ref.: Family relationships between the auditor and the client; invitation to
comment (ITC 99-1)

In its common core of principles on statutory audit independence and objectivity dated
July 1998, to which the IDW contributed significantly, our European organisation FEE has
developed the following requirements concerning personal or business relationships:

Where a close relative is involved in senior management of the client company or
is in a position to exercise direct influence on the preparation of the accounts or
has a material financial interest, the threats of real or perceived lack of objectivity
are in practice too high and too numerous to be over-ridden by possible safe
guards. An individual statutory auditor should therefore not personally accept or
continue an appointment in such a situation".
In the light of these reflections we would like to take the opportunity to respond to the
questions for which comments are requested.

Add 1

We believe that the changes mentioned in question 1 are warranted. For judging auditor
independence from the perspective of Informed third parties (independence in
appearance) we take the view that restrictions have to be applied to those working “on an
engagement" requiring independence.
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Add 2:
A. The IDW is of the opinion when defining those likely to influence the audit - that the
definition provided by alternative B is more appropriate because it extends the scope
of application to partners and managerial employees in an office who perform a
significant portion ofthe audit work.

B. The answer depends on the structure of the audit firm. If all offices of a firm's branch in
a large city are managed separately and act with separate staff, the definition of an
office could be restricted to relatively small entities. If this is not the case it should in
clude all offices belonging to the audit firm's branch.
Add 3

The proposal considers the independence implications of family employment relation
ships in all its ramifications. In our view the independence aspects of the explicit financial
interests that may come with a relative's employment merit being deepened in the same
way. This could be done separately without having a negative effect on the current
Proposal.

Add 4
The definition of "close relative" seems to be comprehensive enough.
Add 5

The IDW considers the definition of the term "Key position" to be appropriate.
Add 6

We support the view taken in the Proposal’s paragraph 5 that the immediate family of
those on the engagement should not be permitted to have any employment by the client.
From the perspective of independence in appearance the employment of an immediate
family member can’t depend on the question whether the position is either audit sensitive
or capable of molding the financial statements.
Add 7

The guidance and the examples provided in Paragraph 7 of the Proposal seem to be
appropriate.
Add 8

A. The potential safeguard mentioned in question 8 should be included in the Proposal.
The use of a separate auditor should be accepted to overcome an otherwise
prohibition irrespective of the size or the significance of the subsidiary for the entire
group.
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B. We consider the other safeguards described in Paragraph 15 of the ITC to be helpful.
It should be noted that - generally speaking - from the view of third parties all
safeguards are useful which contribute to transparency.
Add 9

The IDW takes the view that the Proposal should be expanded to provide guidance in the
case of death and divorce. Given the fact that a general statement is very difficult we are
of the opinion that death and divorce may reduce the existing family relationship but that
these cases should not be treated in a different way.

Add 10
Other broad family relationship models or other key criteria and factors for evaluating
relationships are not evident.
Add 11

Such kind of research does not seem to be available.
We would be pleased to discuss any aspect of this letter which you would like to raise
with us.

Yours sincerely

Horst Kaminski

Executive Director
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October 18, 1999

Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775
RE: Paragraph to be added to ED on Employment with Audit Clients

Gentlemen:

The AICPA’s SEC Practice Section Peer Review Committee and Peer Review Board are pleased to submit
this comment letter to the Independence Standards Board with regard to the paragraph noted below to be
added to the Exposure Draft on Employment with Audit Clients.
Firms that are members of an established peer review program, such as that
offered by the AICPA's SEC Practice Section, should ensure that the scope of the
peer review performed includes an evaluation of thefirm's compliance with the
provisions of this Standard. This would also require an assessment of the
effectiveness with what safeguards were implemented by reviewing all or, if
agreed to by an independent party overseeing the peer review program (such as
the P. O.B.), a sample of the audit engagement subject to this Standard. Firms
whose audit practices are not subject to at least tri-annual peer review must,
at least every three years, engage another practitioner to assess compliance with
these requirements and issue a report on the results of that assessment.

While we believe that it would be appropriate for peer review to include testing of those elements of a
firm’s quality control system relating to insuring compliance with this proposed standard, however, we do
not believe that peer review procedures for testing compliance should be dictated by standard setters or
regulators. As you know, the existing peer review requirements include a number of specified tests to
address the concerns of various regulators and we would be glad to consider amending our requirements to
include required testing for this new standard. In that regard, we believe that the entire paragraph, except
for the last sentence, should not be included in the exposure draft.
In order to change our membership requirements, we would need some clarification and guidance on how
the requirement is going to be implemented by a firm. An example of an item needing clarification would
be when a partner leaves a firm to go to work for a nonclient and a month later leaves that nonclient to go
to work for a client. Would this type of situation come within the scope of the proposed standard? Also,
what kind of tracking system would the ISB expect to be implemented at firms?

We appreciate this opportunity to comment. We would be pleased to discuss in further detail these
comments and any other matters with respect to the paragraph to be added to the Exposure Draft on
Employment with Audit Clients.

Sincerely,

W. Ronald Walton
Chair
SECPS Peer Review Committee

Chair
AICPA Peer Review Board

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
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